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RISE OF THE MACHINES: MACHINE-GENERATED DATA AND THE
†
CONFRONTATION CLAUSE
Brian Sites*
Forensic machines and other such devices can create powerfully
incriminating evidence, and some do so with little or no human aid. In a world
where machines increasingly perform that task, what happens to the right to
cross-examine the human witnesses who would have testified but for the
machines? Through errors, bias, and even fabrication, machine operators,
calibrators, and others involved in the forensic process still have the power to
cause these tools to incriminate the wrong person. There is no shortage of
evidence that this occurs. Many courts have concluded, however, that there is no
right to cross-examine the operators of these machines. This Article analyzes
that result.
The Article begins by discussing Confrontation Clause jurisprudence
from across the nation, including machine-generated testimony cases and areas
of Confrontation Clause jurisprudence that might be instructive in addressing
machine-generated data, such as cases involving photographs, videos,
interpreters, and dog handler testimony. The Article then considers the strengths
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and weaknesses of several potential approaches to machine-generated testimony
and concludes that multiple approaches are defensible, but the approach that
best adheres to the purposes of the Confrontation Clause focuses on the degree
and nature of the operator’s control over the machine. Under that model, there is
no right to cross-examine the operators of many modern machines. Though that
result is troubling, there are alternative models that might extend the lifespan of
the Confrontation Clause. However, as machines become increasingly
automated, the right to cross-examine their human assistants and progenitors
will approach extinction.
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I. INTRODUCTION

“[D]ata are not ‘statements’ in any useful sense. Nor is a
machine a ‘witness against’ anyone. If the readings are ‘statements’
by a ‘witness’ against the defendant, then the machine must be the
declarant. Yet how could one cross-examine a gas
chromatograph?”1
“[T]he witnesses with whom the Confrontation Clause is
concerned are human witnesses . . . .”2
Machines are vital tools for investigating crimes. In this
digital age, they create powerfully incriminating evidence, and
some do so with little or no human aid. Even for machines that
require some human decision-making, most machines do the
heavy-lifting in analysis and data generation. The machines of the
future will do amazing things, but those in the present are already
impressive: facial-recognition software;3 3D lasers and forensic
drones that map crime scenes;4 enhanced law enforcement tools;5
and self-calibrating forensic tools are just the beginning.6
1. United States v. Moon, 512 F.3d 359, 362 (7th Cir. 2008).
2. United States v. Lamons, 532 F.3d 1251, 1263 (11th Cir. 2008)
(emphasis in original).
3. See, e.g., David Kravets, Facial Recognition Nabs 14-year Fugitive in
Nepal, FBI says, ARS TECHNICA (Aug. 13, 2014, 12:20 PM),
http://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2014/08/facial-recognition-nabs-14-year-fugitivein-nepal-fbi-says/.
4. See, e.g., 3D Forensic Mapping, LEICA GEOSYSTEMS, http://www.leicageosystems.us/forensic/3d_scanning.html (last visited Aug. 13, 2014) (describing
its ScanStation model, which “allows the 3D data . . . to automatically be
mapped onto the data producing a visually stunning 3D rendering of the
scene”); Katie Collins, Laser-mapping crime scenes officially a thing,
WIRED.CO.UK. (Feb. 13, 2014), http://www.wired.co.uk/news/archive/201402/13/3d-mapping-crime-scenes (discussing use of 3D mapping devices in
Australia); Domestic drones are already reshaping U.S. crime-fighting,
REUTERS.COM (Mar. 3, 2013, 10:06 AM), http://www.reuters.com/Article/2013/03/
03/us-usa-drones-lawenforcement-idUSBRE92208W20130303
(including
a
comment from a Colorado sheriff’s deputy, “[w]e can now bring the crime scene
right into the jury box, and literally re-enact the crime for jurors”).
5.
See Victor Li, Law enforcement’s latest highway tech speeds up infogathering, but critics say it violates privacy, ABA JOURNAL (Oct. 1, 2014, 4:10
AM), http://www.abajournal.com/magazine/Article/data_driven_latest_highway_
technology_speeds_up_info_gathering_but_critics/ (describing use of automated
license-plate readers and Stingray, a tool that imitates a cell phone tower to gain
information from mobile devices).
6. Among other technologies on the horizon are the FBI’s new “Next
Generation Identification” system and also an “autonomous” five-foot, 300 lb.
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These are not negative developments. But, in a world
where machines increasingly create evidence against defendants,
what happens to the right to cross-examine the human witnesses
who would have testified but for the machines? Through errors,
bias, and even fabrication, machine operators, calibrators, and
others involved in the forensic process still have the power to cause
these persuasive tools to incriminate the wrong person. There is no
shortage of evidence that this occurs.7
Many courts have concluded, however, that forensic
machines speak with a voice of their own, and those statements—
the raw data of a machine—invoke no Confrontation Clause right.8
Although courts hold that the statements of lab analysts in lab
reports are testimonial,9 for machine-generated data, courts have
widely held that it is not the analysts who make the statements: the
declarants are the machines, and there is no right to cross-examine
a machine.10 Mass spectrometers, scales, breathalyzers, and gas
chromatographs alike thus have a story of their own, and they tell

K5 robot designed “to predict and prevent crime” through “predictive analytics”
and “social engagement.” Next Generation Identification, FEDERAL BUREAU OF
INVESTIGATION, http://www.fbi.gov/about-us/cjis/fingerprints_biometrics/ngi (last
visited Aug. 17, 2014) (“This program will further advance the FBI’s biometric
identification services, . . . offer[ing] state-of-the-art biometric identification
services and . . . a flexible framework of core capabilities that will serve as a
platform for multimodal functionality.”).
7. See, e.g., Williams v. Illinois, 132 S. Ct. 2221, 2250 (2012) (Breyer, J.,
concurring) (stating that lab procedures have often been abused and listing
sources in support of that observation); Pamela R. Metzger, Cheating the
Constitution, 59 VAND. L. REV. 475 passim (2006) (same); DNA Exonerations
Nationwide, THE INNOCENCE PROJECT, http://www.innocenceproject.org/
Content/DNA_Exonerations_Nationwide.php (last visited Aug. 17, 2014)
(describing analysis of 316 post-conviction exonerations and attributing
“unvalidated or improper forensic science” as “play[ing] a role in 49 percent of
wrongful convictions later overturned by DNA testing”); Roma Khanna & Steve
McVicker, Probe finds crime lab faked results in 4 cases, HOUSTON CHRONICLE
(June 1, 2005), http://www.chron.com/news/houston-texas/Article/Probe-findscrime-lab-faked-results-in-4-cases-1494739.php (noting, e.g., that one of the
analysts continued to work at the lab years later). Machines can also make
mistakes on their own. See, e.g., David Kravets, License plate reader error leads
to traffic stop at gunpoint, court case, ARS TECHNICA (May 12, 2014, 5:43 PM),
http://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2014/05/after-being-held-at-gunpoint-due-to-lprerror-woman-gets-day-in-court/.
8. See infra Part III.
9. See generally Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 557 U.S. 305 (2009).
10. See, e.g., United States v. Washington, 498 F.3d 225, 229-30 (4th Cir.
2007).
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it in a language immune to the Confrontation Clause.11 The result
is that some evidence once subject to the Confrontation Clause—
because it came in the form of individuals testifying about what
they saw or what they did—no longer triggers a confrontation right
because machines now generate the evidence in place of
humans.12
A right to cross-examine human agents will not catch or
prevent all errors,13 but it will prevent some.14 Further, analysts are
sometimes unavailable for important reasons as illustrated in recent
cases: the analyst might have been indicted for making false
statements under oath,15 have a relevant mental illness,16 or have
been placed on “unpaid leave” for unspecified reasons.17
Revealing that information to the jury, in the analyst’s own words,
may be important. However, that right will come at a price, and
not just as a matter of efficiency.18 In some cases, a right to
confront the operator of the machine will lead to the exclusion of
11. See, e.g., United States v. Moon, 512 F.3d 359, 362 (7th Cir. 2008)
(“the instruments’ readouts are not ‘statements’, so it does not matter whether
they are ‘testimonial’”).
12. See Bullcoming v. New Mexico, 131 S. Ct. 2705, 2712 n.3 (2011) (“The
trial judge [in this case] noted that, when he started out in law practice, ‘there
were no breath tests or blood tests. They just brought in the cop, and the cop
said, ‘Yeah, he was drunk.’”). Notably, machines producing evidence in place of
humans might do so through different methods. For example, while the officer
might have testified that he believed based on his own observations that the
defendant was drunk, a breathalyzer machine testifies to that conclusion based
on an analysis of the defendant’s breath.
13. See, e.g., Merritt Baer, Who Is the Witness to an Internet Crime: The
Confrontation Clause, Digital Forensics, and Child Pornography, 30 SANTA
CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 31, 49-51, 56 (2013) (noting some
examples where such a right would not be beneficial).
14. See, e.g., Williams v. Illinois, 132 S. Ct. 2221, 2246 (2012) (Breyer, J.,
concurring) (noting such an example); id. at 2264 (Kagan, J., dissenting) (same).
15. See, e.g., Lee v. State, 418 S.W.3d 892, 894 (Tex. App. 2013), petition
for discretionary review refused (Mar. 12, 2014).
16. See, e.g., United States v. Ramos-Gonzalez, 664 F.3d 1, 2 (1st Cir.
2011). Many mental illnesses would not be relevant, but some would.
17. See, e.g., Bullcoming, 131 S. Ct. at 2707.
18. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Yohe, 79 A.3d 520, 542 (Pa. 2013)
(concluding that a system using fewer analysts would cause more errors than an
assembly line process); Jennifer Mnookin & David Kaye, Confronting Science:
Expert Evidence and the Confrontation Clause, 2012 SUP. CT. REV. 99, 154
(2012) (“[D]raconian Confrontation Clause rules might well motivate laboratories
to make . . . modifications [such as reducing the number of analysts]. But if these
modifications took laboratories in directions inconsistent with the practices of
science more generally, it is far from clear that these would be positive
developments.”).
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evidence where the original analyst simply changed jobs,19
relocated,20 is on maternity leave,21 or is deceased.22 That could
lead to a windfall for defendants.
This Article addresses the question at the heart of this issue:
are machine-generated “statements” immune to the Confrontation
Clause? And if machines can make statements of their own, how
do we sort out the machine-generated statements from the
statements by their operators? What about machines that operate
with de minimis human control? Which of these, if any, are
immune to the Confrontation Clause, where is the line, and how is
that line determined?
To answer these questions, this Article takes a “weigh all
sides” approach and considers multiple models, identifies cases
and theories that support them, and assesses each model’s
weaknesses. This Article, though based on the study of several
forensic and other machines, takes a machine-agnostic approach
instead of tying analysis to specific machines because the details
are everything, and the machines will vary in important ways from
model to model and setting to setting (including non-lab settings).
In Part II, the Article highlights important portions of the
Supreme Court’s recent Confrontation Clause jurisprudence. Next,
Part III describes the machine-generated testimony doctrine and
cases from around the nation that address this doctrine, most of
which have held that there is no right to cross-examine machine
operators. Part IV reviews other areas of Confrontation Clause
jurisprudence that might be instructive in addressing machinegenerated statements, such as cases involving photographs and
videos, interpreters, and dog handler testimony. Those cases, too,
have generally held there is no right to cross-examine the operators
of a camera, an interpreter who merely translates, or a canine,
though there is an interesting twist as to the latter two groups of
cases. Finally, Part V weighs several potential approaches to
machine-generated testimony and describes their strengths and
weaknesses. Ultimately, the Article concludes that several
approaches are defensible, but argues that the approach that best
adheres to the purposes of the Confrontation Clause focuses on the
19. See, e.g., United States v. Moon, 512 F.3d 359, 361 (7th Cir. 2008).
20. See, e.g., State v. March, 216 S.W.3d 663, 664 (Mo. 2007); State v.
Roach, 95 A.3d 683, 687-88 (N.J. 2014).
21. See, e.g., State v. Oliphant, 127 So. 3d 91, 102 (La. Ct. App. 2013).
22. See, e.g., Scott v. Mule Creek State Prison, No. ED CV 07-909 SVW
PJW, 2010 WL 5563805, at *1 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 28, 2010), aff'd, 504 F. App'x 658
(9th Cir. 2013).
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degree and nature of the operator’s control over the machine.
Under that model, there is no right to cross-examine the operators
of many modern machines. In its final sections, this Article
discusses the extent to which that result is troubling and considers
alternative models that might extend the lifespan of the modern
Confrontation Clause.
Machine-generated testimony does not exist in a vacuum,
and there are other doctrines that may affect the use of machines
to generate evidence. Though this Article remarks on some such
parallel areas, they are not the focus here. One example is the
question that divided the Supreme Court in Williams v. Illinois23 as
to whether a supervisor may—without violating the Confrontation
Clause—testify in court based on evidence that, if admitted directly,
would violate the Confrontation Clause. That divisive question
requires its own separate article, and though the answer to that
question could significantly affect the use of machine-generated
testimony, it will not always do so, and courts are still working
through what Williams means for Confrontation Clause cases.24
Further, some machine-generated data that is likely to be at issue in
a criminal trial should be viewed as being admitted for the truth of
the matter asserted, as others have already articulated, and thus
admission of that data should require the testimony of the data’s
underlying author (who, this Article argues, is not always just the
machine).25

23. See generally Williams v. Illinois, 132 S. Ct. 2221 (2012) (4-1-4
decision).
24. See, e.g., DAVID H. KAYE, DAVID E. BERNSTEIN & JENNIFER L.
MNOOKIN, THE NEW WIGMORE: EXPERT EVIDENCE § 4.12.11 (Aspen Publishers
2014); People v. Lopez, 286 P.3d 469, 483 (Cal. 2012) (Liu, J., dissenting) (“The
nine separate opinions offered by this court in the three confrontation clause
cases decided today reflect the muddled state of current doctrine concerning the
[Confrontation Clause].”).
25. See generally DAVID H. KAYE, DAVID E. BERNSTEIN & JENNIFER L.
MNOOKIN, THE NEW WIGMORE: EXPERT EVIDENCE § 4.10.1 (Aspen Publishers
2014) (rejecting the argument that the otherwise-inadmissible underlying
information is not being admitted for its truth but instead to help the jury
evaluate the testifying expert’s testimony, and thus a surrogate analyst/expert
should be permitted to disclose the underlying information to the jury); id. at
§ 4.10.2 (addressing the harder question of whether an expert may rely on, but
not disclose to the jury, otherwise-inadmissible evidence); id. at § 4.12.5
(addressing this question as it pertains to machine-generated data).
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Finally, there are other avenues through which a defendant
might seek protection in a given case, such as hearsay rules,26 other
constitutional rights,27 and the requirement of establishing an
evidentiary foundation.28 Some courts have concluded, for
example, that the rules of evidence and especially foundation
requirements are the best (or only) proper way to challenge
machine-generated data.29
However, the question of whether machine-generated data
triggers the Confrontation Clause is an important separate
question. First, as a definitional matter, it is important to identify
the boundaries of the Confrontation Clause and how it should
adapt (if at all) to fundamental changes in criminal trials. Second,
to the extent that the machine-generated data doctrine is in tension
with analogous doctrines under the Clause, that division
undermines consistency and is generally jurisprudentially
problematic. Thus, it is important to consider those parallels.
Third, the availability of a right under the Confrontation Clause is
important because it may trigger different analyses at trial and
different standards of review on appeal.30 And, as a practical
matter, some judges may simply take objections founded on an
alleged constitutional error more seriously. Finally, in at least some
situations, the other protections that might require the testimony of
a machine’s operator before admission of the machine’s data at
trial—evidentiary requirements, for example—are simply not doing
the job.31 It is a fair critique that we should target any such failings
26. But see Fed. R. Evid. 801(a) (“‘Statement’ means a person’s oral
assertion, written assertion, or nonverbal conduct, if the person intended it as an
assertion.”) (emphasis added).
27. See, e.g., Gundersen v. Municipality of Anchorage, 792 P.2d 673, 67476 (Alaska 1990) (“[W]e hold that due process requires that the defendant be
given an opportunity to challenge the reliability of that [breath test] evidence in
the simplest and most effective way possible, that is, an independent test [of the
defendant’s intoxication level].”).
28. See, e.g., Napier v. State, 820 N.E.2d 144, 150-51 (holding, based on a
mix of Confrontation Clause and evidentiary foundation rules, that introduction
of data generated by a breathalyzer without any accompanying testimony from
the operator of the machine was error), modified in part on reh’g, 827 N.E.2d
565 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005) (reversing the prior opinion in part).
29. See, e.g., United States v. Washington, 498 F.3d 225, 231 (4th Cir.
2007).
30. See, e.g., United States v. Summers, 666 F.3d 192, 197 (4th Cir. 2011)
(addressing different standards of review); March, 216 S.W.3d at 664 (same).
31. The existence of numerous machine-generated data cases that tackle
the issue from a Confrontation Clause angle—instead of having required
operator testimony at trial based on foundation requirements—provide some
evidence of this potential problem. See infra Part III.
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of evidentiary requirements directly, but that does not remove the
value of also contemplating how the Confrontation Clause
functions in an increasingly automated world or the other
rationales for asking such questions. Accordingly, we turn now to
the question of whether and to what extent the Confrontation
Clause applies to machine-generated testimony.
II. MODERN CONFRONTATION CLAUSE JURISPRUDENCE
The Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment states
that “[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right
. . . to be confronted with the witnesses against him.”32 It applies in
both state and federal prosecutions.33 The Supreme Court has
noted that the relatively simple text of the Clause is susceptible to
multiple interpretations, including that the Clause embraces “those
who actually testify at trial, those whose statements are offered at
trial, or something in-between[.]”34 Similarly, judges and
commentators alike have noted that the intended scope and history
of the Confrontation Clause are less well-known than some other
amendments; in other words, “the Confrontation Clause comes to
us on faded parchment.”35 Nevertheless, the Court has made do,
and five cases are the most relevant to machine-generated
testimony.36 Although the Supreme Court has not directly resolved
the issue of how the Confrontation Clause applies to machinegenerated data, these cases provide the foundation for answering
that question. They also give shape to the modern Confrontation
Clause right generally while defining its edges in areas such as
witness statements during and after emergencies and the use of
forensic reports that are signed by various parties.
32. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
33. Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 406 (1965); see also Crawford v.
Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 42 (2004) (citing Pointer, 380 U.S. at 406).
34. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 42 (citations omitted).
35. California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 174 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring)
(“History seems to give us very little insight into the intended scope of the Sixth
Amendment Confrontation Clause.”); Jules Epstein, Cross-Examination:
Seemingly Ubiquitous, Purportedly Omnipotent, and "At Risk", 14 WIDENER L.
REV. 427, 428, n.7 (2009) (collecting sources and noting “the lack of
contemporaneous documentation of the Framers’ motivations and intentions
regarding [the Confrontation Clause]”).
36. Readers looking for a full description of these cases have plenty of
options to choose from. See, e.g., THE NEW WIGMORE: EXPERT EVIDENCE supra
note 25, § 4.12.11; Jennifer Mnookin & David Kaye, Confronting Science:
Expert Evidence and the Confrontation Clause, 2012 SUP. CT. REV. 99, 103-17
(2012).
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The first of those cases is Crawford v. Washington, decided
in 2004.37 In Crawford, a husband stabbed a man and claimed selfdefense, but the wife’s recounting of the event to police was
arguably inconsistent with a self-defense theory.38 The wife refused
to testify, asserting a state marital privilege, so the State introduced
her prior out-of-court statement.39 The Court held that admitting
the statement violated the husband’s Confrontation Clause right.40
In so holding, the Court jettisoned41 the then-twenty-fouryear-old precedent, Ohio v. Roberts.42 Under Roberts, the analysis
focused on hearsay law and the reliability of the evidence.43 The
Court concluded in Crawford that this approach failed to
adequately address the core concerns of the Confrontation Clause
and stated that “[w]here testimonial statements are involved, we do
not think the Framers meant to leave the Sixth Amendment’s
protection to the vagaries of the rules of evidence, much less to
amorphous notions of ‘reliability.’”44
Instead, the Court concluded that while the Confrontation
Clause’s “ultimate goal is to ensure reliability of evidence . . . it is a
procedural rather than a substantive guarantee. It commands, not
that evidence be reliable, but that reliability be assessed in a
particular manner: by testing in the crucible of crossexamination.”45 The Court then announced the new standard for
Confrontation Clause claims, though it declined to spell out the
standard in full: “Where testimonial evidence is at issue, . . . the
Sixth Amendment demands what the common law required:
unavailability and a prior opportunity for cross-examination.”46
The heart of Crawford, then, is the relatively undefined
term “testimonial,” for only evidence that crosses into that category
triggers the requirements of unavailability and prior opportunity to
cross-examine. Notably, Crawford also indicated a preference for
clear lines in place of malleable, imprecise standards: “[The
Framers] were loath to leave too much discretion in judicial hands.
37. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 36.
38. Id. at 40.
39. Id.
40. Id. at 68.
41. Id. at 60-68.
42. Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56 (1980).
43. Id. at 62-67.
44. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 61; see also id. at 51.
45. Id. at 61.
46. Id. at 68 (emphasis added) (footnote omitted); see also Richard D.
Friedman, Confrontation and Forensic Laboratory Reports, Round Four, 45
TEX. TECH L. REV. 51, 57 (2012).
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By replacing categorical constitutional guarantees with open-ended
balancing tests, we do violence to their design.”47
In the second Confrontation Clause case, Davis v.
Washington, the Court again declined to adopt a comprehensive
definition of “testimonial.”48 Davis involved two consolidated cases:
in one case, a woman called 911 to report an ongoing emergency
(domestic abuse), and in the second case police officers responded
to an alleged incident of domestic abuse that had ended.49 In both
cases, the prosecution sought to introduce out-of-court statements—
the 911 call and the statements of the woman in the second case.50
Justice Scalia, writing for the majority as he did in
Crawford, reiterated that “[o]nly [testimonial] statements . . . cause
the declarant to be a ‘witness’ within the meaning of the
Confrontation Clause.”51 Statements are testimonial, he explained,
when “the primary purpose of the interrogation is to establish or
prove past events potentially relevant to later criminal
prosecution.”52 Applying that test, the Court held that the
statements in the 911 call were not testimonial because they
reflected an ongoing emergency, were intended to help resolve
that emergency rather than just to learn about a potential past
crime, and were part of an exchange that was not significantly
formal.53 On the other hand, the statements in the second case
were testimonial because they were “part of an investigation into
possibly criminal past conduct,” were somewhat formal (involving
separate interviews of the man and woman in different rooms), and
“the primary, if not indeed the sole, purpose of the interrogation
was to investigate a possible crime.”54 In short, the statements
“d[id] precisely what a witness does on direct examination.”55
Finally, the Court cautioned in Davis that “[r]estricting the
Confrontation Clause to the precise forms against which it was
originally directed is a recipe for its extinction.”56 This warning
47. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 68 (citations omitted); see also Whorton v.
Bocktin, 549 U.S. 406, 414 (2007) (criticizing Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56 (1980)
as “too ‘malleable’ in permitting the admission of ex parte testimonial
statements”) (quoting Crawford, 541 U.S at 60)).
48. Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 822 (2006).
49. Id. at 817-21.
50. Id.
51. Id. at 821.
52. Id. at 822; see also Michigan v. Bryant, 131 S. Ct. 1143, 1157 (2011).
53. Davis, 547 U.S. at 827 (discussing each of these factors).
54. Id. at 829-30.
55. Id. at 830 (emphasis in original).
56. Id. at 830 n.5.
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parallels a remark in Crawford that “[a]ny attempt to determine the
application of a constitutional provision to a phenomenon that did
not exist at the time of its adoption . . . involves some degree of
estimation . . . but that is hardly a reason not to make the
estimation as accurate as possible.”57
The third case, Melendez-Diaz, tackled the question of lab
reports.58 Justice Scalia, penning his third opinion in the testimonial
trilogy, considered a case involving three “certificates of analysis”
that stated the results of forensic tests performed on certain seized
substances.59 Those certificates reported the date the bags were
analyzed, an identifying number, the officer who submitted the
bags, a certification by the analyst that the substance was found to
contain cocaine, how much the samples weighed, the defendant’s
name, analyst signatures, a notary public notarization, and other
information.60 While the details varied from certificate to
certificate—such as the weight of the substance and the identifying
number—most of the information was the same across all three
documents.61 The analysts who signed the reports did not testify at
trial, despite the defendant’s objection under the Confrontation
Clause.62
The Court held that the lab reports were “within the core
class of testimonial statements” under Crawford and Davis.63 The
Court first noted that the certificates were “functionally identical to
live, in-court testimony, doing ‘precisely what a witness does on
direct examination.’”64 Justice Scalia continued, explaining:
[N]ot only were the affidavits “made under circumstances
which would lead an objective witness reasonably to
believe that the statement would be available for use at a
later trial,” but under Massachusetts law the sole purpose of
the affidavits was to prove prima facie evidence of the

57. Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 52 n.3 (2004).
58. Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 557 U.S. 305 (2009).
59. Id. at 307.
60. Appendix A, Memorandum and Order Pursuant to Rule 1:28,
Commonwealth v. Melendez-Diaz, 921 N.E.2d 108 (Mass. App. Ct. 2010) (No.
05-P-1213) available at http://www.scotusblog.com/wp/wp-content/uploads/2008/
02/07-591_ob.pdf (last visited Aug. 17, 2014).
61. Melendez-Diaz, 557 U.S. at 307.
62. Id.
63. Id. at 310 (internal quotation marks omitted).
64. Id. (quoting Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 830 (2006)).
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composition, quality, and the net weight of the analyzed
substance.65
Thus, the affidavits were testimonial statements, and the
analysts who prepared them were witnesses for purposes of the
Sixth Amendment.66
In Bullcoming v. New Mexico, the Court took one further
step towards addressing the definition of “testimonial” under the
Confrontation Clause.67 The prosecution charged the defendant in
that case with driving while intoxicated and submitted the
defendant’s blood sample for analysis.68 The resulting report
identified the analyst who conducted the test, the date and time the
sample was drawn, the reason for the defendant’s detention
(“Accident”), and contained certifications from the nurse and
officer as to the blood draw and chain of custody information.69
The report also listed the defendant’s blood-alcohol content
(“BAC”) as determined via gas chromatograph, certified that the
analyst received the sample with seal unbroken, affirmed that the
analyst followed lab procedures listed on the back of the report,
and certified the analyst’s findings.70 The supervising lab employee
also certified that the analyst was qualified to conduct the BAC test
and that the “established procedure” for handling and analyzing
the sample had been followed.71
At trial, the prosecution did not call the analyst who
conducted the analysis to testify because he had recently been
placed on unpaid leave for reasons unstated.72 Instead, the
prosecutor called a different analyst and introduced the BAC
report through that analyst.73 The New Mexico Supreme Court
subsequently concluded that the analyst who prepared the report
“was a mere scrivener” who “simply transcribed the results
generated by the gas chromatograph machine.”74 That court
further stated that the “true ‘accuser’ was the gas chromatograph
65. Id. (quoting Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 52 (2004)) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
66. Id.
67. Bullcoming v. New Mexico, 131 S. Ct. 2705 (2011).
68. Id. at 2710.
69. Id.
70. Id. at 2710-11.
71. Id. at 2711.
72. Id. 2711-12.
73. Id.
74. State v. Bullcoming, 226 P.3d 1, 8-9 (N.M. 2010) (citing, e.g., United
States v. Washington, 498 F.3d 225, 230 (4th Cir. 2007).
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machine,”75 and noted that the substitute analyst that testified in
court could be cross-examined about the machine, the lab’s
procedures, and the BAC results.76 Thus, the Confrontation Clause
allegedly was not violated.
The United States Supreme Court disagreed. The primary
holding in Bullcoming was that the analyst certified more than the
BAC data; he also certified, via the report, that he: received the
defendant’s sample intact and sealed, performed a specific test by
following lab protocols, and that there were no anomalies in that
process that might have “affect[ed] the integrity of the sample or
. . . the validity of the analysis.”77 The Court also concluded that
the prosecution could not enter the testimonial report through the
substitute testimony of another analyst that was familiar with the
process.78
Justice Sotomayor provided the fifth vote in Bullcoming,
but she did so with some reservations. In her concurrence, she
highlighted the fact that Bullcoming did not present the question of
whether one expert could offer his or her opinion in court based
on underlying testimonial records that were not themselves
admitted.79 Justice Sotomayor also noted that “we do not decide
whether . . . a State could introduce (assuming an adequate chain
of custody foundation) raw data generated by a machine in
conjunction with the testimony of an expert witness.”80
In Williams v. Illinois,81 the Court attempted to answer the
first of those two questions. However, Williams was a fractured
decision involving testimony of one analyst who relied on a DNA
typing done by a non-testifying analyst from a different lab.82 In a
plurality opinion by Justice Alito, four Justices upheld the
testimony against a Confrontation Clause challenge, concluding
that the lab results were not introduced for their truth but instead
to show the basis of the expert analyst’s opinion, and thus the
Confrontation Clause was not at issue given the non-truth use.83
The plurality also stated that, even if the results were introduced
for their truth, they were not testimonial because they were not for
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. Bullcoming, 131 S. Ct. at 2714 (alteration in original) (quoting the lab
procedures) (internal quotation marks omitted).
78. Id. at 2715-16.
79. Id. (Sotomayor, J., concurring in part).
80. Id.
81. Williams v. Illinois, 132 S. Ct. 2221 (2012) (plurality).
82. Id. at 2229.
83. Id. at 2233-44.
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the primary purpose of targeting a specific individual, they were
created pursuant to an ongoing emergency (catching a rapist), and
the results were reliable.84
Justice Thomas concurred in result only, providing the fifth
vote; he rejected the plurality’s reasoning in full but, under his own
test, concluded that the results were not sufficiently formal and thus
did not trigger the Confrontation Clause.85 The four dissenting
justices agreed with Justice Thomas that the plurality’s test was
incorrect and a departure from the Court’s Confrontation Clause
jurisprudence, but they also rejected Justice Thomas’s formality
test.86 This 4-1-4 decision—with five votes rejecting the plurality’s
reasoning yet upholding the admission of the results only because
the results were insufficiently formal for Justice Thomas—has
generally led to confusion in state and federal courts about the
impact of Williams.87
While Williams has some general import in terms of one
expert testifying based on the results of another non-testifying
expert, it does not shed significant light on the underlying question
of when machine-generated results trigger the Confrontation
Clause, nor does it clearly resolve when an expert may testify
based on machine-generated data that the expert did not
generate.88 Even if it did, however, it remains relevant whether the
underlying data is machine-generated or not, as that can shape
various matters, including what an analyst may rely on and
disclose to the factfinder.89 In light of the open questions and

84. Id. at 2242-44.
85. Id. at 2255-64 (Thomas, J., concurring).
86. Id. at 2264-77 (Kagan, J., dissenting).
87. See, e.g., Marc D. Ginsberg, The Confrontation Clause and Forensic
Autopsy Reports—A “Testimonial,” 74 LA. L. REV. 117, 135 (2013); cf. Williams,
132 S. Ct. at 2244 (Breyer, J., concurring) (“This case raises a question that I
believe neither the plurality nor the dissent answers adequately . . . .”).
88. See, e.g., THE NEW WIGMORE: EXPERT EVIDENCE, supra note 24,
§ 4.12.6 (“[N]or does [Williams] offer any potential further analysis of the issues
surrounding machine-produced information relied upon by experts.”); DAVID L.
FAIGMAN ET AL., 4 MODERN SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE § 31:38 (2013-14 ed.)
(“Because Williams appears directly at odds with Bullcoming and MelendezDiaz, and because it was a highly fractured opinion, it is difficult to know what
to make of its ultimate scope. Moreover, some of the open questions left
unresolved by those earlier cases persist—such as exactly who among those who
come into contact with evidence must testify to satisfy constitutional
requirements.”).
89. See, e.g., 5 MODERN SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE § 42:15 (2013-14 ed.).
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general confusion after Williams, it is likely that the Court will
speak again on the Confrontation Clause, and soon.90
III. MACHINE-GENERATED DATA AND THE RISE OF THE MACHINES
Under the machine-generated testimony doctrine, courts
across the nation have held that machine-generated data does not
trigger the Confrontation Clause because it is the machines—not
the analysts operating them—that make the statements at issue, and
machines are not “witnesses” within the meaning of the
Confrontation Clause.91 As is described further in Part V, this rise
of the machines is arguably inconsistent with the treatment of
forensic evidence in Melendez-Diaz and Bullcoming, and it is an
exception that could swallow their holdings whole as machines
become increasingly widespread and automated. This Part
discusses the contours of the machine-generated testimony doctrine
and cases promoting it, beginning with the doctrine’s genesis in
United States v. Washington.92
In Washington, a police officer pulled over an individual
engaging in erratic driving and took him to a hospital where the
defendant consented to giving a blood sample.93 The sample was
sent for analysis, and the forensic machines printed out
approximately twenty pages of data.94 Based on the data, the lab
director issued a report stating the blood sample contained certain
amounts of intoxicants.95 The three analysts who actually

90. See, e.g., Richard D. Friedman, Confrontation and Forensic
Laboratory Reports, Round Four, 45 TEX. TECH L. REV. 51, 82 (2012). In the
course of editing this Article, the Court granted certiorari in Ohio v. Clark, No.
13-1352, 2014 WL 1882769, at *1 (U.S. Oct. 2, 2014).
91. See infra notes 92–120. See also Peter Nicolas, But What If the Court
Reporter Is Lying? The Right to Confront Hidden Declarants Found in
Transcripts of Former Testimony, 2010 B.Y.U. L. REV. 1149, 1192-93 (2010)
(noting, while addressing a different issue, that “the Confrontation Clause
encompasses only statements by people”).
92. United States v. Washington, 498 F.3d 225 (4th Cir. 2007). Though
other cases preceded Washington, in the post-Crawford world, Washington
functions as the first test to adopt this analysis. See, e.g., Joe Bourne,
Prosecutorial Use of Forensic Science at Trial: When is a Lab Report
Testimonial?, 93 MINN. L. REV. 1058, 1079-80 (2009) (describing Washington as
“an analytical angle from which no other court had approached a Crawford
issue pertaining to forensic science”).
93. Washington, 498 F.3d at 227-28.
94. Id.
95. Id.
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conducted the tests using the machines did not testify in court, but
their supervisor testified based on the raw data.96
At trial, the defendant claimed a right to cross-examine the
three analysts themselves, arguing that the lab director’s reliance
on raw data from tests he neither performed nor observed violated
the Confrontation Clause.97 The trial court disagreed and admitted
the testimony.98 The Fourth Circuit affirmed on appeal99 and
explained that:
[T]he “statements” in question are alleged to be the
assertions that [the defendant’s] blood sample contained
PCP and alcohol. But those statements were never made by
the technicians who tested the blood. The most the
technicians could have said was that the printed data from
their chromatograph machines showed that the blood
contained PCP and alcohol. The machine printout is the
only source of the statement, and no person viewed a
blood sample and concluded that it contained PCP and
alcohol. . . . In short, the inculpating “statement”—that [the
defendant]’s blood sample contained PCP and alcohol—was
made by the machine . . . . But “statements” made by
machines are not out-of-court statements made by
declarants that are subject to the Confrontation Clause.100
The court also supported its conclusion on other grounds.
First, the court concluded that there was no value in crossexamining the technicians: the machines made the statements, and
the technicians would know only what the machine data had told
them.101 Second, the Fourth Circuit stressed that if the concern was
the reliability of the data, that issue would be properly addressed
through the process of authentication of the evidence,102 and if the
defendant wanted to question the technicians, he could subpoena
them into court.103 Finally, the court concluded that the statements
made by the machines were not testimonial because “the
machine’s output did not ‘establish or prove past events’ and did

96.
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.

Id. at 228-29.
Id.
Id. at 227.
Id. at 232.
Id. at 229-30.
Id. at 230.
Id. at 232 (discussing the requirements of laying a foundation).
Id. at 231 n.3.
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not look forward to ‘later criminal prosecution.’”104 And so the
machine-generated testimony doctrine was born.105
Many courts have found this doctrine persuasive.106 In
United States v. Blazier, the Court of Appeals for the Armed
Forces went so far as to state that “it is well-settled that under both
the Confrontation Clause and the rules of evidence, machinegenerated data and printouts are not statements and thus not
hearsay—machines are not declarants—and such data is therefore
not ‘testimonial.’”107 In United States v. Moon, the Seventh Circuit
endorsed Washington’s approach in a case involving raw data from
an infrared spectrometer and a gas chromatograph.108 As in
Washington, Moon involved one expert testifying in court based
on the raw data produced by analysis that a different analyst
conducted.109 The Seventh Circuit held that the conclusions the
non-testifying chemist came to were testimonial, but the raw data
from the machines was not.110 Similarly, in United States v.
Lamons, the Eleventh Circuit cited approvingly both Washington
and Moon, holding that data produced by a machine
memorializing telephone calls made was not testimonial because
“the witnesses with whom the Confrontation Clause is concerned
are human witnesses,” and the data in Lamons was the statement
of a machine.111
The endorsement of Washington has not been limited to
appellate courts. In United States v. Crockett, a federal district
court held that “[t]he instrument readouts and printouts” resulting
from analysis of cocaine did not implicate the Confrontation
Clause or hearsay rule.112 Nor has support been confined to
104. Id. at 232 (quoting Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 822 (2006)).
105. See, e.g., Joe Bourne, Prosecutorial Use of Forensic Science at Trial:
When is a Lab Report Testimonial?, 93 MINN. L. REV. 1058, 1079-80 (2009).
106. See, e.g., United States v. Drayton, No. PWG-13-0251, 2014 WL
2919792, at *6 (D. Md. June 26, 2014) (“[A] machine cannot bear witness against
an accused within the meaning of the Confrontation Clause . . . . [O]nly a
human may be a declarant . . . .”). But see United States v. Ramos-Gonzalez, 664
F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2011) (concluding, without analyzing the machine-generated
testimony doctrine, that the testimony of one analyst about, inter alia, the results
of a test violated the Confrontation Clause).
107. United States v. Blazier, 69 M.J. 218, 224 (C.A.A.F. 2010).
108. United States v. Moon, 512 F.3d 359 (7th Cir. 2008).
109. Id. at 360-61.
110. Id. at 361.
111. United States v. Lamons, 532 F.3d 1251, 1260-61, 1263 (11th Cir. 2008)
(emphasis in original).
112. United States v. Crockett, 586 F. Supp. 2d 877, 885 (E.D. Mich. 2008);
see also Adams v. United States, No. 09-6152 (GEB), 2011 WL 1792562, at *3-4

54

COLUM. SCI. & TECH. L. REV.

[Vol. XVI

federal courts.113 For example, in Hamilton v. State, a Texas state
court held that the raw data produced by DNA analysis was a
machine-generated statement and “[t]he Confrontation Clause
implicates statements made by persons, not machines.”114 In
People v. Lopez, the Supreme Court of California held that
“[b]ecause, unlike a person, a machine cannot be cross-examined,
here the prosecution’s introduction into evidence of the machinegenerated printouts . . . did not implicate the Sixth Amendment’s
right to confrontation.”115 The Connecticut Supreme Court, relying
heavily on Washington, reached a similar result.116 Courts have
reached analogous conclusions for, e.g., DNA results,117
breathalyzer results,118 urinalysis results,119 and machine-generated
data from equipment outside the lab.120 Some courts have also
(D.N.J. May 10, 2011) (addressing, as an alternative basis for the court’s ruling,
the merits of a 28 U.S.C. § 2255 habeas corpus claim that alleged error under
the Confrontation Clause, and citing, e.g., Washington and Moon).
113. See, e.g., Leger v. State, 732 S.E.2d 53, 60 (Ga. 2012) (supervisor may
testify about data generated by other analysts); People v. Brown, 918 N.E.2d 927,
931 (N.Y. 2009) (“The . . . report, furthermore, was not ‘testimonial’ . . . because
it consisted of merely machine-generated graphs, charts and numerical data.”);
State v. Keck, No. 09CA50, 2011 WL 1233196, at *5-6 (Ohio Ct. App. Mar. 30,
2011) (no Confrontation Clause violation where one analyst testified to her
analysis, which was based in part on the apparently machine-generated DNA
results that another analyst produced); cf. State v. Ortiz-Zape, 743 S.E.2d 156,
162 (N.C. 2013) (citing Washington and Moon approvingly), cert. denied, 134 S.
Ct. 2660 (2014); State v. Dilboy, 48 A.3d 983, 989 (N.H. 2012) (noting that
testimony based on “raw data, such as graphic or numerical computer printouts,
. . . [might] not . . . violat[e] . . . the Confrontation Clause”).
114. Hamilton v. State, 300 S.W.3d 14, 21-22 (Tex. Ct. App. 2009).
115. People v. Lopez, 286 P.3d 469, 478 (Cal. 2012).
116. State v. Buckland, 96 A.3d 1163, 1172 (Conn. 2014) (“We hold that the
machine generated data is not subject to the restrictions imposed by Crawford,
Melendez–Diaz and Bullcoming.”).
117. See, e.g., State v. Gomez, 244 P.3d 1163, 1166 (Ariz. 2010); People v.
Arauz, 2D CRIM. No. B242843, 2013 WL 3357931, at *5 (Cal. Ct. App. July 3,
2013), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 2664 (2014).
118. See Cranston v. State, 936 N.E.2d 342, 345 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010);
People v. Dinardo, 801 N.W.2d 73, 79 (Mich. App. Ct. 2010); Wimbish v.
Commonwealth, 658 S.E.2d 715, 719-20 (Va. Ct. App. 2008).
119. See Marshall v. People, 309 P.3d 943, 947 (Colo. 2013); United States
v. Bradford, 2009 WL 4250093, at *9 (A.F. Ct. Crim. App. Nov. 23, 2009);
United States v. Anderson, 2009 WL 4250095, at *5 (A.F. Ct. Crim. App. Nov.
23, 2009); United States v. Skrede, 2009 WL 4250031, at *3 (A.F. Ct. Crim. App.
Nov. 23, 2009).
120. See, e.g., Stultz v. Artus, No. 04-CV-3170 (RRM), 2013 WL 937830, at
*9-10 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 8, 2013) (automated message stating a payphone’s phone
number was a statement by a machine, which falls outside the scope of the
Confrontation Clause); cf. Robertson v. Commonwealth, 738 S.E.2d 531, 532-33
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reached the same results without specifically discussing machinegenerated testimony, such as decisions based on the general
observation that a supervisor may testify about tests performed by
other analysts or the specific point that the supervisor may rely on
raw data generated by other analysts.121
Washington also has staying power; it was decided in 2007,
before Melendez-Diaz, Bullcoming, and Williams, and the petition
for certiorari was still pending when the Court issued MelendezDiaz.122 Though the Court granted petitions for certiorari in other
cases and remanded them for reconsideration in light of MelendezDiaz, the Supreme Court denied the petition in Washington.123 In
the wake of these various decisions, the Fourth Circuit has not
overruled Washington.124 Several courts have held that
Washington’s approach is still sound after Melendez-Diaz,

(Va. Ct. App. 2013) (en banc) (involving, but not addressing as such, machinegenerated prices from a cash register).
121. See Smith v. State, 28 So. 3d 838, 854-55 (Fla. 2009) (per curiam)
(discussing this issue and citing Washington and Moon approvingly); id. at 87879 (Canady, J., concurring) (disagreeing with the Court’s opinion only on other
issues); Rector v. State, 681 S.E.2d 157, 160 (Ga. 2009) (holding that a
toxicologist could testify about tests and results obtained by another doctor
because the toxicologist “reviewed the data and testing procedure” and “[a]n
expert may base [his] opinions on data gathered by others”) (second alteration
in original); State v. Roach, 95 A.3d 683, 694-99 (N.J. 2014) (an analyst who
tested one DNA sample may testify about a DNA match based on results that
depended, in part, on testing for a second DNA sample that another analyst
generated); Commonwealth v. Yohe, 79 A.3d 520, 540 (Pa. 2013) (“[W]e hold
that [the reviewing supervisor] is the analyst who determined Appellant's [bloodalcohol content]. Although he relied on the raw data produced by the lab
technicians [who ran the machines] . . . he is the only individual who engaged in
the critical comparative analysis of the results of the . . . tests . . . and determined
Appellant's BAC.”); see also id. at 541-42 (collecting cases); cf. United States v.
Hamilton, 413 F.3d 1138, 1142 (10th Cir. 2005) (computer-generated header
“was generated instantaneously by the computer without the assistance or input
of a person” and so, in the context of the hearsay rules, there was no “statement”
or “declarant”) (collecting cases).
122. See United States v. Washington, 498 F.3d 225 (4th Cir. 2007), cert.
denied, 557 U.S. 934 (2009).
123. See Washington v. United States, 129 S. Ct. 2856 (2009) (denial of cert.
petition). This does not mean that the Supreme Court necessarily approved of
the result in Washington, as there are many reasons a court of discretionary
jurisdiction might deny review. The point only is that the Court had an
opportunity to address the doctrine post-Melendez-Diaz, or at least to require the
Fourth Circuit to reconsider in light of Melendez-Diaz, but declined to do so.
124. See, e.g., United States v. Summers, 666 F.3d 192, 202-03 (4th Cir.
2011) (alleles were machine-generated data; distinguishing Bullcoming and
Melendez-Diaz).
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Bullcoming, and Williams.125 For example, in United States v.
Darden, a federal district court in Maryland (a court in the same
federal circuit as Washington) held that Melendez-Diaz did not
disturb the logic of Washington.126 The Seventh Circuit has also
adhered, post-Williams et al., to its conclusion in Moon.127 Other
courts, considering the issue for the first time or upon
reconsideration after the Williams et al. decisions, have also held
that machine-generated data does not trigger a confrontation
right.128 Indeed, courts expressly considering the rationale in
Washington appear to widely agree that raw data is not testimonial
under the new post-Crawford line of cases.129
The rise of machines has not been without resistance,
however. For example, jurisdictions that have adopted the
machine-generated testimony doctrine or something similar have
not done so without dissent.130 And in Young v. United States, the
D.C. Circuit found a Confrontation Clause violation where a
supervisor gave surrogate testimony about DNA tests that she
neither conducted nor was present for; in doing so, the court
“emphasize[d] . . . that it is too simplistic to say that the DNA
profiles and the [random-match probability] were not hearsay
125. See, e.g., United States v. Darden, 656 F. Supp. 2d 560, 563-64 (E.D.
Ma. 2009); Hamilton v. State, 300 S.W.3d 14, 21 (Tex. App. 2009); United States
v. Anderson, No. 2009-06, 2009 WL 4250095, at *5 (A.F. Ct. Crim. App. Nov.
23, 2009).
126. Darden, 656 F. Supp. 2d at 563-64.
127. See, e.g., United States v. Maxwell, 724 F.3d 724, 726-27 (7th Cir.
2013).
128. See, e.g., Oliver v. State, No. 14-09-00690-CR, 2010 WL 3307391, at *4
(Tex. App. Aug. 24, 2010); United States v. Drayton, Criminal No. PWG-130251, 2014 WL 2919792, at *8-9 (D. Md. June 26, 2014); People v. Lopez, 286
P.3d 469, 478 (Cal. 2012); People v. Revill, No. B233987, 2013 WL 6094307, at
*9-13 (Cal. Ct. App. Nov. 20, 2013).
129. See, e.g., United States v. Bradford, Misc. Dkt. No. 2009-07, 2009 WL
4250093, at *5 (A.F. Ct. Crim. App. Nov. 23, 2009) (not reported) (“A survey of
the case law following the issuance of Melendez-Diaz reveals [that] the courts are
focusing on the requirement that an expert testify and that he or she do so using
the data produced by the labs as the basis for his or her testimony. The lab
technicians were not required to be produced as witnesses.”), rev’d on other
grounds by 68 M.J. 371 (C.A.A.F. 2010).
130. See, e.g., United States v. Washington, 498 F.3d 225, 232 (Michael, J.,
dissenting); State v. Roach, 95 A.3d 683, 698-701 (N.J. 2014) (Albin, J.,
dissenting); cf. Pendergrass v. State, 913 N.E.2d 703, 711 (Ind. 2009) (Rucker, J.,
dissenting) (not addressing the machine-generated testimony doctrine, but stating
“despite whatever ambiguity Melendez–Diaz may have created on the question
of who must testify at trial, it appears to me the opinion is clear enough that a
defendant has a constitutional right to confront at the very least the analyst that
actually conducts the tests”).
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because they were ‘nothing more than the raw data produced by a
machine.’”131 Thus, though courts have widely concluded that
machine-generated data does not require the testimony of the
analyst who operated the machine, the consensus is not
unanimous.
IV. PARALLEL DOCTRINES UNDER THE CONFRONTATION CLAUSE
This Part considers areas of Confrontation Clause
jurisprudence that address analogous areas to the machinegenerated testimony doctrine: photographs, videos, interpreters,
and dog-handler testimony. These areas, just like machinegenerated data cases, involve an assertion by one entity that is
arguably attributable to (or at least influenced by) a separate entity.
Under these cases, courts have frequently rejected Confrontation
Clause claims seeking to cross-examine a camera operator,
interpreter, or canine. However, they have not done so without
dissent, and courts frequently require the testimony of a dog’s
handler when canine evidence is at issue.
This Part summarizes cases from around the country on
these topics. In Part IV, we consider whether those parallel areas
might offer guidance for analyzing machine-generated data. For
example, if the raw print-out of a gas chromatograph is subject to
cross-examination, shouldn’t the print-out of a camera—a
photograph—be as well? Similarly, if the digital output of a
breathalyzer triggers a confrontation right, would the digital output
of a surveillance camera? If neither photographs nor videos trigger
a Confrontation Clause right, why should other machine-generated
data?
Notably, although these separate doctrinal lines have
parallels to machine-generated data, they are in some ways very
different. Those differences are discussed in Part IV. Further, some
131. Young v. United States, 63 A.3d 1033, 1046 (D.C. Cir. 2013) (quoting
United States v. Summers, 666 F.3d 192, 202 (4th Cir. 2011)). The D.C. Circuit
went on to state that “the [data at issue] do[es] not stand on [its] own but,
instead, ha[s] meaning because [it] amount[s] to a communication by the
scientists who produced [it]—the assertion, essentially, that the scientists
generated these specific results by properly performing certain tests and
procedures on particular, uncorrupted evidence and correctly recording the
outcomes.” See also United States v. Ramos-Gonzalez, 664 F.3d 1, 6 (1st Cir.
2011) (concluding, without analyzing the machine-generated testimony doctrine,
that the testimony of one analyst about, inter alia, the results of a test violated the
Confrontation Clause); cf. Martin v. State, 60 A.3d 1100, 1106 (Del. 2013)
(lending some support to the right to cross-examine the operating analyst in
machine-generated data contexts).
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of these doctrines are in tension with the post-Crawford
Confrontation Clause. However, the purpose of this section is not
to critique these parallel fields. Instead, it is to identify potential
anchors for analysis of machine-generated data. In the course of
describing those proposals, Part IV identifies some problems with
these anchors so as to avoid mooring the ship in treacherous
waters.
A. Photographs and Videos
A photograph transcribes reality into a fixed image, but the
angle, shutter speed, and other decisions made by the
photographer shape that transcription.132 Indeed, the notion that
there is an authoring element to taking a photograph—a human
contribution—is central to other legal issues, such as the
copyrightability of images.133 And at least for forensic photographs,
132. One term used to refer to this is “camera perspective bias,” and some
studies have shown that camera perspective and depth of image alter
interpretation of confessions. In one such study, individuals who viewed a video
of a defendant’s confession were more likely to believe the confession was
coerced if the interrogator was visible in the video than if the interrogator was
not visible. Additionally, the angle from which evidence, such as blood splatters,
is photographed can alter perception and analysis of the evidence. As one court
described it:
Somewhat depends for exact likeness upon the nice
adjustment of machinery, upon atmospheric conditions,
upon the position of the subject, the intensity of the light,
the length of the sitting. It is the skill of the operator that
takes care of these, as it is the skill of the artist that makes
correct drawing of features, and nice mingling of tints, for
the portrait. . . . The portrait and the photograph may err,
and so may the witness. That is an infirmity to which all
human testimony is lamentably liable.
Cowley v. People, 83 N.Y. 464, 478 (1881). See also Heimbach v. Peltz, 121
A.2d 114, 116-17 (Pa. 1956); Commonwealth v. McKellick, 24 A.3d 982, 996 (Pa.
Super. Ct. 2011) (Donohue, J., dissenting); Jennifer L. Mnookin, Videotaped
Confessions Can Be Misleading, NEW YORK TIMES (July 13, 2014),
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/07/14/opinion/videotaped-confessions-canbe-misleading.html; Dave Munger, False confessions: Even judges are biased by
camera
perspective,
SCIENCE
BLOGS
(Mar.
15,
2007),
http://scienceblogs.com/cognitivedaily/2007/03/15/false-confessions-evenjudges/; see generally Jennifer L. Mnookin, The Image of Truth: Photographic
Evidence and the Power of Analogy, 10 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 1, 4, 20-27 (1998).
133. See, e.g., Schrock v. Learning Curve Int’l, Inc., 586 F.3d 513, 519, 522
(7th Cir. 2009) (collecting cases discussing photographers’ contributions to the
originality of photographs and the derivative work right); Ets-Hokin v. Skyy
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the images are often the photographer’s assertion about reality:
“this is the crime scene,” “this is the wound at issue,” “this is the
defendant,” and so on. If viewed as assertions by human operators,
a photograph taken in anticipation of trial might be seen as
testimonial and subject to the Confrontation Clause.
However, courts have often admitted photographs without
any discussion of Confrontation Clause matters, and many cases
hold that there is no requirement that the photographer be crossexamined prior to the admission of the photograph.134 Courts have
admitted, despite challenges based on the Confrontation Clause,
images of lost evidence,135 the crime scene,136 the victim,137 the
crime itself,138 and other matters.139 These holdings stem, in part,
from the view that photographs are often seen as demonstrative or

Spirits, Inc., 225 F.3d 1068, 1073-77 (9th Cir. 2000) (collecting cases and
describing the history of copyright protection for photographs). In the Copyright
Office’s draft of its copyright practices compendium, it states that “the Office will
refuse to register a claim if it determines that a human being did not create the
work.” Compendium of the U.S. Copyright Office Practices 300 (3d ed. Aug. 19,
2014) (draft of the compendium); see also id. at 301 (“Similarly, the Office will
not register works produced by a machine or mere mechanical process that
operates randomly or automatically without any creative input or intervention
from a human author.”).
134. See, e.g., Sevin v. Parish of Jefferson, 621 F. Supp. 2d 372, 383 (E.D.
La. 2009) (addressing images from red-light cameras); People v. Williams, No.
302154, 2013 WL 163818, at *3 (Mich. Ct. App. Jan. 15, 2013) (photos of a
victim’s injuries and a shotgun the defendant allegedly possessed); State v.
Williams, 913 S.W.2d 462, 465 (Tenn. 1996) (surveillance images taken by a
store camera the cashier triggered during a robbery).
135. See, e.g., United States v. Beach, 196 F. App’x 205, 209 (4th Cir. 2006)
(per curiam) (photographs of seized evidence that police lost were not shown to
“conceivably constitute the ‘testimonial’ statements that Crawford bars”).
136. State v. Newcomb, No. 43578-1-II, 2014 WL 2601699, at *3 (Wash. Ct.
App. June 10, 2014).
137. See, e.g., People v. Ellis, 154 Cal. Rptr. 3d 378, 387-89 (Ct. App. 2013),
review granted and opinion superseded, 301 P.3d 1176 (Cal. 2013); People v.
Myers, 928 N.Y.S.2d 407, 410 (N.Y. App. Div. 2011); Williams v. State, No. 0912-00350-CR, 2014 WL 1102004, at *5 (Tex. App. Mar. 19, 2014); Herrera v.
State, 367 S.W.3d 762, 773 (Tex. App. 2012); Phipps v. People, 54 V.I. 543, 56465 (2011).
138. See, e.g., People v. Goldsmith, 326 P.3d 239, 250 (Cal. 2014).
139. See, e.g., State v. Chavez, No. 1 CA-CR 08-0731, 2009 WL 4981849, at
*3-4 (Ariz. Ct. App. Dec. 22, 2009) (addressing, inter alia, Confrontation Clause
challenge to photographs of an individual, T.A., “throwing [gang] signs,”
through which the prosecution sought to show that T.A. was in a gang that was a
rival to defendant’s gang).
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illustrative evidence, i.e., they merely illustrate verbal testimony
and are not evidence in and of themselves.140
Similarly, except when they contain a person speaking in a
testimonial capacity,141 courts have often admitted videos without
requiring cross-examination pursuant to the Confrontation
Clause.142 This is true even though, or perhaps because, videos
may be seen as “better than eyewitnesses because films are
perceived as never mistaken.”143 There are also many cases that
involved the admission of video evidence without discussion of a
right to confrontation, often because the video was viewed as
merely demonstrative evidence.144 As with photographs, courts
have admitted, despite Confrontation Clause challenges, several
types of videos, including recordings of field sobriety tests,145 a
140. See, e.g., State v. Newcomb, No. 43578-1-II, 2014 WL 2601699 at *3
(Wash. Ct. App. June 10, 2014) (“[C]ourts regard photographs as demonstrative
evidence . . . . The proper foundation for photographs requires only that some
witness . . . be able to give some indication as to when, where, and under what
circumstances the photograph was taken, and that the photograph accurately
portrays the subject illustrated.”); see also Jennifer L. Mnookin, The Image of
Truth: Photographic Evidence and the Power of Analogy, 10 YALE J.L. &
HUMAN, n.129 at 44-45; cf. People v. Thomas, 269 P.3d 1109, 1136-37 (Cal.
2012) (rejecting Confrontation Clause claim raised against the use of a police
artist’s drawings of the scene because the depictions were not admitted for their
truth but instead only to illustrate witness testimony).
In some cases, the images have no apparent human photographer, such as
for images from red-light cameras. See, e.g., People v. Goldsmith, 326 P.3d 239,
249-50 (Cal. 2014); State v. Melsky, No. A-0193-12T2, 2013 WL 1776037, at *4
(N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. Apr. 26, 2013) (per curiam).
141. See, e.g., Coronado v. State, 351 S.W.3d 315, 324 (Tex. Crim. App.
2011) (concluding that “[v]irtually all courts that have reviewed the admissibility
of forensic child-interview statements or videotapes after the Davis decision have
found them to be ‘testimonial’ and inadmissible unless the child testifies at trial
or the defendant had a prior opportunity for cross-examination”) (collecting
cases); see also State v. Hooper, 176 P.3d 911, 914-16 (Idaho 2007) (“Since the
purpose of a forensic interview is to collect information to be used in a criminal
prosecution, . . . the interview was the functional equivalent of a police
interrogation [and the video was testimonial].”).
142. See, e.g., Amparo v. McDonald, No. C 09-0801 MMC (PR), 2012 WL
1094291, at *10 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 30, 2012) (“Because a camera is not a witness
that is amenable to cross-examination, and because a photograph . . . is not a
testimonial statement, the videotape here at issue does not implicate the
Confrontation Clause.”) (internal quotation marks omitted).
143. Jessica M. Silbey, Judges As Film Critics: New Approaches to Filmic
Evidence, 37 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 493, 516 (2004).
144. See id. at 507 (2004) (collecting cases).
145. Commonwealth v. McKellick, 24 A.3d 982, 985-89 (Pa. Super. Ct.
2011); Delgado v. State, No. 10-10-00164-CR, 2011 WL 4389956, at *3-4 (Tex.
App. Sept. 21, 2011).
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store camera’s footage of a crime,146 and other surveillance
videos.147
B. Interpreters
Interpreters have met mixed results under the
Confrontation Clause, but defendants generally have no right to
cross-examine them. Some courts have held that an interpreter’s
translation of the defendant’s statements triggers the Confrontation
Clause,148 but many others have held that an interpreter is merely
a “language conduit” or agent for the defendant and, therefore, the
defendant is the declarant and has no right to crossexamine/confront him or herself.149 The language conduit and
agency approaches differ in their underlying tests, but the end

146. See, e.g., State v. Wynn, No. 2011CA00244, 2012 WL 3068361, at *5-6
(Ohio Ct. App. July 16, 2012).
147. See, e.g., Vaughn v. State, 13 N.E.3d 873, 874 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014)
(videos of a confidential informant purchasing drugs were not testimonial
because they “were not meant to be an assertion” and “merely showed the
conduct of the CI and [defendant]”); State v. Perkins, No. 09–CR–0280, 2011
WL 2345291, at *3 (Ohio Ct. App. June 6, 2011) (video tape created by law
enforcement of the defendant approaching the site of a drug transaction was not
testimonial in nature because “the tape[] [was] merely being used to establish the
context of a defendant’s statements and not to prove the truth of the matter
asserted [therein]”); State v. Smith, No. M2010-02077-CCA-R3-CD, 2012 WL
3776679, at *4 (Tenn. Crim. App. Aug. 31, 2012) (admission of video of drug
transaction did not violate Confrontation Clause because some statements
therein were made by defendant and some were not introduced to prove the
truth of the matter asserted).
148. See, e.g., United States v. Charles, 722 F.3d 1319, 1322-31 (11th Cir.
2013) (officer’s in-court testimony about translation of defendant’s answers
during an interrogation violated defendant’s right to confront the interpreter,
who was the declarant of those statements, but no plain error in light of lack of
prior binding precedent on that point).
149. See, e.g., United States v. Orm Hieng, 679 F.3d 1131, 1139 (9th Cir.
2012); United States v. Budha, 495 F. App’x 452, 454 (5th Cir. 2012); United
States v. Desire, 502 F. App’x 818, 821 (11th Cir. 2012); United States v. RomoChavez, 681 F.3d 955, 961 (9th Cir. 2012); Hernandez v. State, 662 S.E.2d 325,
330 (Ga. Ct. App. 2008); see also Charles, 722 F.3d at 1333 n.2 (11th Cir. 2013)
(Marcus, J., specially concurring) (collecting cases); United States v. Skiljevic,
No. 11-CR-72, 2013 WL 3353960, at *4-5 (E.D. Wis. July 3, 2013); People v.
Malanche, No. F060845, 2012 WL 688069, at *5 (Cal. Ct. App. Mar. 2, 2012)
(unpublished); People v. Jackson, 808 N.W.2d 541, 550-52 (Mich. Ct. App.
2011). For more discussion of a defendant’s right to confront and cross-examine
his or her own confession, see Mark A. Summers, Taking Confrontation
Seriously: Does Crawford Mean That Confessions Must Be Cross-Examined?, 76
ALB. L. REV. 1805 (2012-13).
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result is the same: the defendant is treated as the declarant.150 In
analyzing such claims under the Confrontation Clause or hearsay
rules, courts have considered several factors: who supplied the
interpreter; the interpreter’s skill at translation and relevant
qualifications; whether there is any indication that the interpreter
had a motive to mislead or distort; whether there was any
indication of inaccuracy in the translation; and whether the actions
the parties took after the conversation were consistent with the
translations.151
Three key issues reoccur in those results: who is the
declarant of the translated material, when are the translations
testimonial, and when are the translations used to establish “the
truth of the matter asserted” therein?152 Notably, with regards to
the lattermost of those three issues, the Eleventh Circuit has held
that translators implicitly assert that the translation provided is
accurate: “when the translator created the transcripts, he or she
represented that each English word, phrase, or concept
corresponded to the original Spanish word, phrase, or concept.”153
Finally, some courts, even while recognizing that a defendant has a
right to inquire into the translator’s honesty and competency, have
concluded that the Confrontation Clause does not require that
such a right be achieved through cross-examining the translator.154

150. See, e.g., People v. Morel, 798 N.Y.S.2d 315, 318 (N.Y. App. Div.
2005) (describing the tests in the hearsay rule context: “[T]he agency approach
. . . treats a translator’s rendering of a declarant’s statement as if it were the
declarant’s own once the agency relationship is established, as opposed to the
conduit theory which attributes a translator’s statements to the declarant so long
as the translator’s skill and fidelity to a proper translation is established[.]”).
151. See, e.g., Charles, 722 F.3d at 1324-25 & n.6; Romo-Chavez, 681 F.3d
at 959-61; Orm Hieng, 679 F.3d at 1139; Skiljevic, 2013 WL 3353960, at *4-5;
Hernandez, 662 S.E.2d at 329-30; Jackson, 808 N.W.2d at 552.
152. See, e.g., United States v. Curbelo, 726 F.3d 1260, 1272-73 (11th Cir.
2013), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 962 (2014).
153. Id.
154. See, e.g., Morel, 798 N.Y.S.2d 315, 319 (concluding that “the
translator’s willingness and capacity to render statements accurately from one
language to another . . . is a purely state-law ‘reliability’ issue” and the translator
was a mere language conduit); Hernandez 662 S.E.2d at 330 (citing Morel). An
analogous problem is whether a court reporter’s transcript of testimony raises
Confrontation Clause problems. See generally Peter Nicolas, But What If the
Court Reporter Is Lying? The Right to Confront Hidden Declarants Found in
Transcripts of Former Testimony, 2010 B.Y.U. L. Rev. 1149 (2010) (discussing
this issue).
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C. Canine Units
Criminal defendants sometimes seek to “cross-examine” a
canine working as either a drug-sniffing dog or a tracker.155 Under
the normal definition of “cross-examine,” that request is impossible
to fulfill, and so the defendant is asking either to exclude such
evidence (presumably categorically) or to require the prosecution
to bring the dog to court so the defendant may “be confronted
with the witness[] against him,”156 perhaps so the animal could be
tasked with demonstrating its tracking or drug-sniffing abilities,
which are the canine’s relevant “testimony” in any event.157 Courts
have rejected this and other similar claims under a number of
overlapping rationales: dogs are not capable of making testimonial
statements;158 the dog is not the witness, the handler is;159 and dogs
are not witnesses or declarants within the meaning of the
Confrontation Clause and the rules of evidence.160 Along the way,
155. Compare State v. Washington, No. OT–12–032, 2014 WL 1343696,
at *12 (Ohio. Ct. App. 2014) (drug-sniffing case), with State v. Keodara, 128
Wash. App. 1040, 1 (Wash. Ct. App. 2005) (tracking case).
156. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
157. For an example of a case seeking to bring the dog to court, see United
States v. Carroll, 710 F.2d 164, 168 n.1 (4th Cir. 1983).
158. See, e.g., State v. Washington, 2014 WL 1343696, at *12 (“The dog
sniff is not a statement, nor is the dog capable of making a testimonial statement.
Therefore, appellant has no right to cross-examine the dog and his Sixth
Amendment right to confront witnesses against him was not violated.”).
159. See, e.g., Carroll, 710 F.2d at 168 n.1; State v. Streeper, 747 P.2d 71, 75
(Idaho 1987); State v. Davis, 97 So. 449, 454 (La. 1923); State v. Wanczyk, 482
A.2d 964, 966 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1984); People v. Centolella, 305
N.Y.S.2d 279, 282 (N.Y. Crim. Ct. 1969); Commonwealth v. Michaux, 520 A.2d
1177, 1181-82 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1987); State v. Bostick, 169 S.E.2d 608, 610 (S.C.
1969); cf. Terrell v. State, 239 A.2d 128, 136-37 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1968)
(concluding that the accused has an opportunity to confront his accuser because
the handler is merely testifying to his or her observations); State v. Storm, 238
P.2d 1161, 1186 (Mont. 1951) (Angstman, J., dissenting) (“It is an erroneous
notion to regard the hounds as witnesses . . . . The witness is the trainer of the
dogs and defendant’s constitutional rights are protected and preserved by the
right to cross-examine the owner and trainer of the dogs.”) (citations omitted);
State v. Brown, 88 S.E. 21, 23 (S.C. 1916) (not expressly addressing the
Confrontation Clause, but concluding that “[t]he dog is not the witness”).
160. See, e.g., State v. Dickerson, 82 N.E. 969, 974-76 (Ohio 1907) (stating
approvingly that “the dogs were not witnesses whom the accused had a right to
confront at the trial, in any different sense than the tracks of a man accused may
be described as to form, size, or any other characteristic by which he may be
identified”); Keodara, 128 Wash. App. at 2 (“[The tracking canine] was not a
‘declarant’ for purposes of [the defendant]’s right to confront witnesses.”); see
generally Andrew E. Taslitz, Does the Cold Nose Know? The Unscientific Myth
of the Dog Scent Lineup, 42 HASTINGS L.J. 15, 112-13 (1990) (collecting cases).
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however, courts have accrued some dissenters, who have argued
that the dog is the real witness, or even an inherently mute expert
witness.161
Courts often emphasize, or even require, the presence of
the handler’s or trainer’s testimony at trial in rejecting
Confrontation Clause challenges.162 As a practical matter, the
handler’s testimony is also necessary in most cases because, absent
the handler’s testimony, there is no evidence of the dog’s alert.163
The handler’s testimony is also important because the actions of
the handler can alter the results produced by the canine; in other
words, the subtle (or intentional) cues of the handler can shape (or
direct) the dog’s tracking and alerts.164
Courts have frequently debated the appropriate
circumstances in which canine tracking or alert evidence should be
161. See, e.g., State v. Davis, 97 So. 449, 457 (La. 1923) (O’Niell, J.,
dissenting) (“The ruling that [bloodhound] evidence is admissible . . . is violative
of the fundamental right of an accused person to be faced by and to crossexamine the witnesses against him. . . . [T]he idea that the bloodhound does not
testify is only skin-deep. The bloodhound, in such case, is a supposed expert
witness, who cannot give any reason for his expert opinion . . . .”); see also
Pedigo v. Commonwealth, 44 S.W. 143, 146-47 (Ky. 1898) (Guffy, J., concurring
in part and dissenting in part) (addressing canine evidence and noting the
inability to cross-examine the dog, who in reality is the witness); State v. Grba,
194 N.W. 250, 259 (Iowa 1923) (“[Canine] evidence is in the nature of expert
testimony with no opportunity whatever to cross-examine the expert or find out
from any source any reason for the conduct of the dogs . . . .”), overruled by
State v. Buller, 517 N.W.2d 711 (Iowa 1994); cf. Brott v. State, 97 N.W. 593, 594
(Neb. 1903) (rejecting canine evidence on general evidentiary principles).
162. See, e.g., Davis, 97 So. at 454 (“[S]uch evidence is not inadmissible on
the ground that the dog is the witness and cannot be cross-examined, since it is
the human testimony which makes the trailing done by the animal competent,
and the defendant was confronted by the witnesses to such testimony . . . .”); cf.
Terrell, 239 A.2d at 136-37 (“The trainer should be questioned to see if the dog
was properly trained and the trail followed correctly . . . . It is the trainer who
controls the dog, therefore, he should be the one to be examined and crossexamined.”); State v. Barger, 612 S.W.2d 485, 490 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1980)
(“The inability of the defendant to cross-examine the dog is not considered
prejudicial, so long as its owner, trainer, or handler is made available for
examination as to the dog’s general qualifications and specific activities on the
day in question.”); Wanczyk, 482 A.2d at 967 (describing items the handler at
issue would have to testify about).
163. But see Starkes v. United States, 427 A.2d 437, 439 n.2 (D.C. Cir. 1981)
(noting that, in addition to the tracker’s testimony, an onlooker testified at trial
that he saw the dog—as it was tracking the trail—arrive at the location and
identify the area in question).
164. State v. Brown, 88 S.E. 21, 23 (S.C. 1916) (“This control of the animal,
that is supposed to have the instinct, by the man, who has not the instinct,
destroys any value it may have as evidence . . . .”).
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used. Although much of this debate has centered on the Fourth
Amendment question of when a dog’s alert is sufficient to create
probable cause or otherwise be introduced as evidence to support
a search,165 the issue has also arisen under a more general
evidentiary posture.166 Courts have required various showings to
support canine evidence, including the following considerations:
whether the dog actually possessed the ability at issue (to track or
alert to certain circumstances); whether the dog is a pure blood of
a stock characterized by acute scent and discernment; the dog’s
accuracy record in the field and in controlled tests; the dog
handler’s experience and training; and the circumstances of the
alert/tracking (weather, was the track fresh, did other scents
contaminate the area, handler actions during the dog’s
investigation, etc.).167 Finally, in rejecting Confrontation Clause and
related claims, courts have also expressly compared canine
evidence to other items that cannot be cross-examined, such as
scientific instruments168 and photographs.169
V. POTENTIAL MODELS FOR MACHINE-GENERATED SPEECH
As Part III described, many courts have accepted the
proposition that data generated by a machine: (1) is the statement
of the machine only, (2) is not testimonial, and (3) for either or
both of those reasons, such data does not trigger a right to confront
and cross-examine humans involved, such as the machine’s
165. See generally Florida v. Harris, 133 S. Ct. 1050 (2013) (addressing
whether a drug-detection dog’s alert created probable cause for a warrantless
search of a vehicle).
166. See, e.g., Streeper, 747 P.2d at 75 (Idaho 1987) (rejecting a
Confrontation Clause challenge to canine evidence but describing certain
foundational requirements for such evidence); Terrell, 239 A.2d at 130
(addressing whether the evidence of tracking by a police dog was properly
admitted into evidence and, as a separate issue, whether there was probable
cause to arrest).
167. See, e.g., Starkes, 427 A.2d at 439; Streeper, 747 P.2d at 75-76; State v.
White, 642 S.E.2d 607, 614-15 (S.C. Ct. App. 2007) (collecting cases), aff’d but
criticized, 676 S.E.2d 684 (2009); People v. Centolella, 305 N.Y.S.2d 460, 462
(N.Y. Crim. Ct. 1969); see also Harris, 133 S. Ct. 1050 (2013) (addressing dogtracking); see generally 22A C.J.S. Criminal Law § 1026 (2014) (addressing dogtracking evidence, foundation requirements, and collecting cases).
168. See, e.g., Centolella, 305 N.Y.S.2d at 282 (“The animals are not
witnesses against a defendant any more than a microscope or a spectograph.”).
169. See, e.g., Starkes, 427 A.2d at 440 (“With respect to appellant’s
observation that the dog could not be cross-examined, we point out that other
demonstrative evidence such as photographs and exhibits also cannot be crossexamined.”).
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operator. As Part IV revealed, that result is consistent with the
treatment of photographs and videos, but somewhat inconsistent
with courts’ treatment of canine evidence where the handler is
considered the declarant and the right to confront and crossexamine him or her is seen as important. In this final Part of the
Article, we consider those results, along with the interpreter cases,
in terms of how they align with the post-Crawford world. In doing
so, this Part begins with less complex areas and then continues
across the spectrum to areas that are more debatable and divisive.
Whatever analytical model is adopted for machinegenerated evidence, it should be able to address the wide variety
of machines that produce potential evidence because they all
present fundamentally the same question: who is speaking, the
operator, the machine, those involved in the machine’s creation
and maintenance, or some combination of these? The list of
machines that generate potential evidence is vast and includes gas
chromatographs, fingerprint databases, digital scales, breathalyzers,
GPS and other location data, software that logs actions,
thermometers, photocopies, cash registers, TASERs, photographs
and videos, and a host of other data-generating devices.170 Thus,
the description herein, though using some machine types as
examples, is intentionally machine-agnostic. Developing a model
for this broad range of machines involves two key questions that
have animated the majority of cases adopting the machinegenerated testimony doctrine: (1) does data generated by a
machine involve an entity that falls within the scope of the
Confrontation Clause; and (2) if so, is machine-generated data
testimonial? We now turn to those questions.
A. Lab Certifications, Affidavits, and Formal Reports
“We already know that the government may not introduce
forensic laboratory reports or affidavits reporting the results of
170. Examples of cases involving many of these machines are cited in Parts
III and IV, supra. See also State v. Jennings, 9 A.3d 446, 457 (Conn. App. Ct.
2011) (cash register receipt that reported the value of 101 DVDs defendant was
alleged to have attempted to steal); Ethridge v. State, No. 12-09-00190-CR, 2012
WL 1379648, at *18 (Tex. Ct. App. Apr. 18, 2012) (photocopy of an allegedly
forged check; the defendant might have been arguing that the writings on the
forged check were testimonial, but the court concluded that defendant’s
argument was unclear, id. at *20); cf. Mathews v. Broce, No. 5:11-CV-133 MTT,
2012 WL 3527073, at *6 (M.D. Ga. Aug. 15, 2012) (hearsay challenge to data
stored on a TASER about the gun’s use on a suspect); Merritt Baer, Who Is the
Witness to an Internet Crime: The Confrontation Clause, Digital Forensics, and
Child Pornography, 30 SANTA CLARA HIGH TECH. L.J. 31, 48 (2013).
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forensic tests and use them as substantive evidence against a
defendant unless the analyst who prepared or certified the report is
offered as a live witness subject to cross-examination.”171 The key
attribute for this category is that a person has asserted something in
that report or affidavit. Similarly, when certifications attached to
data are at issue—such as when an analyst asserts that the data was
produced after adherence to certain protocols—courts should deem
those assertions testimonial.
It is also clear that the hearsay rules, though relevant to the
inquiry, do not directly define the scope of the Confrontation
Clause.172 For example, business records are not nontestimonial
merely because they fall within the business records provision.173
Similarly, courts should conclude that the fact that the modern
definition of hearsay in rule 801 is a statement made by “a
person”174 does not restrict the Confrontation Clause to
“person[s].”175
However, the Confrontation Clause itself arguably imposes
that restriction. It is debatable whether the intended scope of the
Confrontation Clause encompassed machine-generated data given
the limited technology available at and around the time of the
Clause’s adoption (which included the thermometer and some
other assertive tools).176 However, unless the Confrontation Clause
171. United States v. Maxwell, 724 F.3d 724, 726 (7th Cir. 2013) (emphasis
added) (citing Bullcoming v. New Mexico, 131 S. Ct. 2705, 2710 (2011);
Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 557 U.S. 305, 329 (2009) (reviewing for plain
error)).
172. Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 61 (“Where testimonial
statements are involved, we do not think the Framers meant to leave the Sixth
Amendment's protection to the vagaries of the rules of evidence, much less to
amorphous notions of ‘reliability.’”).
173. Melendez-Diaz, 557 U.S. at 324 (“Business and public records are
generally admissible absent confrontation not because they qualify under an
exception to the hearsay rules, but because—having been created for the
administration of an entity’s affairs and not for the purpose of establishing or
proving some fact at trial—they are not testimonial.”).
174. FED. R. EVID. 801(a) (“‘Statement’ means a person’s oral assertion,
written assertion, or nonverbal conduct, if the person intended it as an
assertion.”).
175. But see United States v. Washington, 498 F.3d 225, 231 (4th Cir. 2007)
(appearing to define the scope of the Confrontation Clause based on the
definition of hearsay in the Federal Rules of Evidence).
176. See also Jennifer Mnookin & David Kaye, Confronting Science: Expert
Evidence and the Confrontation Clause, 2012 SUP. CT. REV. 99, 155 n.142
(2012) (“Arguably, testimony relying on distributed cognition [which is a
hallmark of science] is a modern phenomenon without clear Founding-era
equivalents.”).
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is reimagined to provide a different sort of “confrontation” or
“cross-examination,” statements made purely by machines do not
fall within either practice’s current implementation because you
cannot cross-examine a machine. Nor do machines themselves
meet the other requirements of Crawford et al.: they do not create
data with any primary purpose of their own, they do not act under
oath or solemnly in the traditional understandings of those terms,
and even concepts of their availability would be strained.177 This
Article proceeds on the premise that there is no right to crossexamine a machine and, thus, that statements made solely by
machines do not trigger a cross-examination right.178
B. Humans Communicating Through or About Machines
Moving down the spectrum, we encounter humans
communicating through machines, such as through word
processors, text messages, video- or audio-recorded interviews, and
the like. The machine-generated testimony doctrine should not
mean that information is deemed “machine-generated” merely
because a machine was used in its maintenance, provision, or
creation.179 This is important for both definitional reasons and
because of the significant difference in treatment that machinegenerated and human-generated evidence receive in the eyes of
many courts.
For example, if a historical record, such as of past driving
infractions, is typed into a database by humans, the print-out of
that record does not become “machine-generated” merely because
the machine (a printer) literally generated it.180 The underlying
177. See, e.g., Erick J. Poorbaugh, Interfacing Your Accuser: Computerized
Evidence and the Confrontation Clause Following Melendez-Diaz, 23 REGENT
U. L. REV. 213, 224-25 (2011) (contemplating whether “‘things’ can speak for
themselves”) (capitalization omitted).
178. It would be possible to reimagine the Confrontation Clause to provide
a right to confront and cross-examine a machine. That approach may be the
best way to apply the Confrontation Clause to the modern world. The issue is
briefly addressed in the final portions of this Article, but it is a topic that requires
separate discussion.
179. Cf. United States v. Lamons, 532 F.3d 1251, 1268 n.25 (11th Cir. 2008)
(“[N]o one can seriously doubt the proposition that this opinion itself is a wholly
human-generated statement, despite the fact that a machine—a word processor
on a computer—aided its production.”).
180. But see Commonwealth v. Carter, 80 Va. Cir. 527, 534 (Va. Cir. Ct.
2010) (concluding that a transcript of driving records that were entered by DMV
clerks was not the statement of a witness because it was “generated by a
machine and presented without human analysis or interpretation”). The
transcript was also excluded because, inter alia, it was not created in anticipation
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data entry of the humans is still a “statement” by the clerks who
typed it in, and thus would be subject to the normal requirements
of the Confrontation Clause. Similarly, if Cobham181 had
(anachronisms aside) typed his accusatory letter and printed it out,
it would not become the statement of the printer; it would remain
Cobham’s accusations, communicated through the machine. In
other words, the machine did not create the contents, a human
did; the machine merely reported human input.182
Similarly, if an analyst writes down content displayed on a
machine or other facts about what the machine did before, during,
or after testing (the noises it made, error lights that did or did not
illuminate, etc.), that process would transform the machinegenerated data into a human’s assertion about what that data was,
which would be subject to the Confrontation Clause (if testimonial)
just like a witness repeating what color the traffic light was when a
drunk driver ran it, or a police officer repeating an eye witness’s
alleged description of the perpetrator.
For example, in Robertson v. Commonwealth, a customer
tried to steal several items.183 A store manager directed an
employee to use a register’s scanner to find the prices of the
items.184 The employee scanned the items, looked at the price
displayed on the register, and wrote a list of the prices.185 In that
situation, the prices displayed by the register were statements by
the machine, but the handwritten list was the statement of the
human operator.186
of a trial but instead for normal DMV purposes, such as issuing licenses and tax
assessments.
181. See, e.g., Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 44 (2004) (“Lord
Cobham, [a historical defendant]’s alleged accomplice, had implicated [that
defendant] in an examination before the Privy Council and in a letter. At . . .
trial, these were read to the jury.”).
182. See, e.g., John C. O’Brien, The Hearsay Within Confrontation, 29 ST.
LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 501, 521 (2010) (making a similar observation); cf.
CHRISTOPHER B. MUELLER ET AL., 4 FEDERAL EVIDENCE § 8:13 (4th ed. 2014)
(“Sometimes the output of machines is a direct and obvious reflection of human
assertions or input, such as conversations captured by recording devices,
printouts of business data, and the content of websites. In these settings, ordinary
hearsay analysis is appropriate.”).
183. Robertson v. Commonwealth, 738 S.E.2d 531, 532-33 (Va. Ct. App.
2013) (en banc).
184. Id. at 533.
185. Id.
186. The court concluded that the list, which was admitted at trial, was also
a statement by the manager who oversaw the scanning and testified at trial. Id.
at 537.
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Also falling in this area are statements about labels attached
to raw data. For example, if an analyst types in a defendant’s
name, sample number, or testing purpose, those entries are the
analyst’s statements. Some of them might also be testimonial,
depending on the circumstances. They are not, however,
statements of the machine just because the machine included them
with the raw data the machine printed. Similarly, if a human types
data into a machine and that machine generates a barcode, RFID
tag,187 or other digital marker, the data (now in barcode or other
such form) does not become machine-generated when a second
machine learns the relevant information via the barcode and prints
out that data. A barcode or digital encoding of the defendant’s
name, sample number, etc., is still a statement by whoever typed
that information into the machine that generated the barcode.
To illustrate this example, imagine that analyst Y wrote
down in English the purpose for which a sample was to be tested,
and analyst X translated it into Spanish. We would not say that the
Spanish version is entirely the statement of X; it would remain, at
least in part (depending on the court’s theory of the interpreter’s
role), the statement of Y. So, too, when a machine translates the
analyst-entered defendant’s name, sample number, testing purpose,
etc., into a computer language like a barcode. When a subsequent
machine translates the barcode back into English (or whatever
language) and includes it on the print-out of raw data, it is still, in
part, the statement of the human analyst who initially entered it.
In these situations, the machine-generated testimony
doctrine should be inapplicable because humans generated the
relevant statements and machines merely repeated them. Some
such statements might not be testimonial, as in the case of driving
infractions recorded by the DMV for non-criminal purposes. Other
statements, like Cobham’s, will fall within the heart of the
Confrontation Clause. But because, in the eyes of some courts,
statements generated by a machine do not trigger Confrontation
Clause rights—but human-generated statements do—it is significant
whether the words are attributed to a human author.

187. A radio-frequency identification (“RFID”) tag is a device used to
identify and track things through the use of radio waves. See, e.g., RFID
Definition, DICTIONARY.COM, http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/rfid (last
visited Oct. 5, 2014); see also RFID Tag Definition, PC Magazine,
http://www.pcmag.com/encyclopedia/term/56955/rfid-tag (last visited Oct. 5,
2014).
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C. Automated Machines and Progenitors
As a result of technological advancements, numerous datagenerating machines act without a human operator. Digital
thermometers and weather stations track temperature and
humidity, license plate scanners record vehicle plates, GPS and
other motion-tracking devices log movement, and online software
such as Google’s Content ID continuously patrol videos uploaded
to YouTube.com for copyright infringement.188 This data can be
vital in criminal trials: unusually high temperatures (from grow
lights) may reveal a location where drugs are grown, license plates
may reveal stolen cars, GPS logs may contradict alibis, and
evidence of video uploads may be relevant in criminal proceedings
for copyright matters.
The salient point for our purposes is not whether these
particular devices do or do not require operator input in their dayto-day operation (a question that may vary from machine to
machine). There are numerous machines that now—once built,
programmed, and set in motion by a human—require only, at
most, occasional oversight. The rest of the time, the machines do
what they do without a human’s touch. For these machines, given
the lack of contemporaneous or near-contemporaneous human
involvement in generating the data, that data should be treated as
the machine’s “statements.”
We must still consider, however, the fact that people build
machines, program them, and set them in motion. A machine that
operates on its own and generates data about a target is only
carrying out the analysis that the inventor, manufacturer, and
programmer created it to undertake.189 Those individuals, the
machine’s “progenitors,” built the machine to make assertions of
fact. The machine’s ultimate assertions could be viewed as the
188. See, e.g., License Plate Reader: LPR-HR, PERCEPTICS,
http://www.abajournal.com/magazine/Article/data_driven_latest_highway_techno
logy_speeds_up_info_gathering_but_critics/ (last visited Aug. 14, 2014)
(describing a license plate reader model with “95+% guaranteed read rate” that is
“capable of reading all plate types day or night and in any kind of weather” to
“capture state, province or country of origin ID”); How Content ID Works,
GOOGLE, https://support.google.com/youtube/answer/2797370 (last visited Aug.
12, 2014) (describing the Content ID copyright infringement detection system).
189. Cf. CHRISTOPHER B. MUELLER ET AL., 4 FEDERAL EVIDENCE § 8:13
(4th ed. 2014) (“A moment’s reflection leads to the conclusion that information
produced by machines is, at one remove or many, a reflection of human design,
engineering, programming, calibration, and purposeful input, all aimed at
generating machine output. Hence machine-generated information is a
legitimate concern of the hearsay doctrine.”).
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assertions of those progenitors because they set the machine in
motion for that specific primary purpose: to make assertions on the
progenitors’ behalf. In other areas of the law, courts attribute the
actions of machines to the humans who built them (e.g. product
liability) or operate them (e.g. copyright in a photograph); the
same could be true for the Confrontation Clause. A GC-MS (a
common forensic machine), for example, is built to make
assertions. Essentially, it is designed to assert what the sample it
tested is made of.190 When a GC-MS produces data, it is only
following instructions specified by human agents to do what it was
made to do, assert things; but for the existence of the GC-MS,
humans might have made those same (or at least similar) assertions
by recording the results of a chemical analysis they conducted.
Is the GC-MS truly speaking on its own? Machines can
produce data in a variety of forms—graphical print-outs, electronic
records and so on—but the machines are, in some form, only the
last link in a long line of instructions given by human actors. Just as
we attribute a photograph to the photographer and liability in
some product liability cases to the manufacturer, we could attribute
an assertive machine’s data to the human progenitors. It is the
progenitors’ contributions and instructions that enabled the
machine to make the assertions.
However, our fifth-grade grammar teacher did the same
thing for each of us, as did other teachers, our parents, and so
forth. A request to call any of them to the stand under the
Confrontation Clause—based on their contributions to our ability to
speak and accuse someone—would be futile. Although a machine,
unlike each of us, has no choice but to follow the instructions it
was given, the machine’s progenitor gave that machine only
general training about how to make assertions, not specific
instructions about what to assert for a particular sample. The
progenitors also provided only the potential to make assertions; the
machine makes that assertion without the progenitor knowing
anything about the tested samples. In these ways, though a
machine “learns” and follows instructions in a different way than
we do, the machine is not merely the mouthpiece for its
progenitors as to a particular assertion for a particular sample.
When a browser returns search results from, say, Bing.com, it

190. For a simplified explanation of how a GC-MS functions, see GCSE
Bitesize: Analyzing Substances, BBC, http://www.bbc.co.uk/schools/gcsebitesize/
science/add_aqa/atomic_structure/analysing_substancerev2.shtml (last visited
Aug. 14, 2014).
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would be anomalous to consider the results as the assertions also of
Bill Gates, one of the search engine’s innumerable progenitors.
For these reasons, courts could reject the request to call
manufacturers and engineers to the stand on the theory that they
designed, built, and programmed the scale that ultimately
displayed the weight of the cocaine the suspect had in his pocket.
Courts could conclude that these contributions are not assertions in
the sense of the Confrontation Clause nor are the progenitors
“witnesses” within the Clause’s meaning—their contribution to the
real assertion, the machine’s data, is too remote.191 That result
makes sense.
As a practical matter, for most machines, the progenitors
also would not be a collection of speakers but a chorus of dozens,
if not hundreds and thousands, of manufacturers, designers,
programmers, technicians, managers, etc. The Supreme Court has
already indicated that it is not necessary to call innumerable
witnesses to the stand in the context of forensic assertions,192 and
other courts have been loath to require the testimony of multiple
people involved in the chain of custody or maintenance of
machines.193 Significant practical difficulties would arise in any
attempt to call dozens or more progenitors to testify as contributors
to a machine’s data.
We can also reach that same result another way, both for
grammar teachers and machine progenitors: even assuming that
progenitors do make assertions through machines in a sense that
triggers the Confrontation Clause, those inventors, manufacturers,
and programmers usually will not have “spoken” in a way that is
testimonial.194 Under the traditional test for what is testimonial,

191. A distinction could be made for assertive machines—machines made to
advance claims about aspects of reality. Where a machine is designed for the
primary purpose of making assertions about reality, a court could, theoretically,
carve out an exception to the Confrontation Clause. It is unclear where this
exception would be grounded in the text of the Confrontation Clause, however.
192. Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 557 U.S. 305, 311 n.1 (2009) (“[W]e
do not hold, and it is not the case, that anyone whose testimony may be relevant
in establishing the chain of custody, authenticity of the sample, or accuracy of
the testing device, must appear in person as part of the prosecution's case.”).
193. See infra pp. 44-45.
194. Cf. Jennifer Mnookin & David Kaye, Confronting Science: Expert
Evidence and the Confrontation Clause, 2012 SUP. CT. REV. 99, 151-52 (2012)
(“The operator of a breathalyzer relies upon a machine he himself likely only
partly understands—enormous technical knowledge is literally built into it. But
that knowledge is not testimonial under any of the Court's definitions.”); John C.
O’Brien, The Hearsay Within Confrontation, 29 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 501,
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described in Davis, Melendez-Diaz, and Bullcoming, the
progenitors have not acted with a primary purpose of creating
evidence for a trial. When they built the machine, there was no
specific trial to contemplate, nor was there even a specific crime,
victim, or defendant at issue (identified or otherwise). Though the
machines might—if actually purchased and used—produce evidence
for a trial, they might instead be used for a variety of purposes
other than to produce evidence for a criminal trial. Purely
hypothetical future trials and crimes do not satisfy the “testimonial”
requirement.
Williams should not change that analysis because, though
there is a grain of accuracy in the plurality’s test for what is
testimonial, it is only a grain. In Williams, part of the disagreement
between the plurality and the other justices was the plurality’s
adoption of a definition of testimonial that required that the
statement have “the primary purpose of accusing a targeted
individual.”195 Five other justices rejected this test in no uncertain
terms.196 The dissent’s position is the better-reasoned analysis in
this regard because the important question is whether there is a
non-hypothetical trial or crime at hand, not an identified
perpetrator. First, the plurality’s test was not as target-agnostic as
those justices suggested: the profile that would result from testing a
DNA sample that was from a rape case obviously can, and
hopefully will, incriminate someone. There is a clear target (the
unknown person from whom the sample derives), a crime has
occurred and is being investigated, and a trial is not only
hypothetically possible but actually in the investigatory stages. That
targeting is not theoretical: the analysts are running tests on a
targeted biological sample to extract, hopefully, the perpetrator’s
DNA.
Second, the plurality’s analysis assumes the targetless nature
of the test (and accompanying quality of the analyst), and that
assumption directly undermines a key rationale behind the
Confrontation Clause—giving the defendant and the fact finder a
chance to assess the declarant. Courts generally will not know
516 (2010) (noting that a “declarant’s lack of an intent to assert [a] matter sought
to be proved seems totally at odds with the concept of a testimonial statement”).
195. Williams v. Illinois, 132 S. Ct. 2221, 2243 (2012) (plurality) (emphasis
added). See also id. at 2243-44 (“Similarly, no one at Cellmark could have
possibly known that the profile that it produced would turn out to inculpate
petitioner—or for that matter, anyone else whose DNA profile was in a law
enforcement database.”).
196. Id. at 2262 (Thomas, J., concurring); id. at 2273-74 (Kagan, J.,
dissenting).
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whether the analyst has fabricated the result or framed the
defendant, which is unlikely.197 In either of those situations, the
analyst who created the underlying profile has targeted someone,
for whatever reasons, and not only knows but apparently intends
the resulting profile to be potential evidence in a future trial. In
other words, in the case of intentional sample contamination or
drylabbing,198 the analyst has selected a target to incriminate. By
assuming otherwise, the plurality deprives the defendant of the
chance to cross-examine that analyst; there is no certainty that
cross-examination will reveal the malfeasance,199 but it sometimes
does200 and, in any event, the chance to do so is why the
Confrontation Clause exists.
The plurality might (correctly) respond to this observation
by noting that the primary purpose analysis is “an objective test” in
which the court “look[s] for the primary purpose that a reasonable
person would have ascribed to the statement, taking into account
all of the surrounding circumstances.”201 It is not focused on
whether the analyst at issue actually did or did not fabricate the
results and target someone. Would a reasonable person assume
that a lab result was not fabricated? A reasonable person would
know of the numerous forensic lab scandals, including dry-lab and
fabrication incidents.202 In light of those scandals and the reality
that analysts do select targets in some cases, a reasonable person
should answer that it is unclear whether the primary purpose of the
analyst was to accuse a targeted individual. Further, because there
is a non-hypothetical defendant (the sample tested came from a
rape kit), a reasonable person would recognize that the test is
targeting someone; the analyst (if he or she is honest and not fixing
the results) simply does not know who.

197. See, e.g., supra note 7 (addressing examples of fabricated work, lab
errors, and similar incidents).
198. See, e.g., Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 557 U.S.305, 319 (2009)
(noting that “‘drylabbing’ [is] where forensic analysts report results of tests that
were never performed”) (citation omitted).
199. See, e.g., Williams, 132 S. Ct. at 2250 (Breyer, J., concurring) (“In the
wrongful-conviction cases to which this Court has previously referred, the
forensic experts all testified in court and were available for cross-examination
[yet admission of the faulty evidence was not prevented].”).
200. Id. at 2246 (Breyer, J., concurring) (noting such an example); id. at
2264 (Kagan, J., dissenting) (same).
201. Id. at 2243 (citing Michigan v. Bryant, 131 S. Ct. 1143 (2011)).
202. See, e.g., note 7.
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For these reasons, the definitions of “testimonial” found in
Melendez-Diaz, Bullcoming, and the other post-Crawford cases203
should be followed by the lower courts, which should reject the
requirement in Williams that the analyst must have targeted a
known individual. Instead, courts should adopt a requirement that
the data targeted someone generally, such as when a witness
describes facts about a getaway car, gives a description of the
defendant that the witness does not personally know, or when a
dog tracks a scent of an unidentified perpetrator. That test should
be deemed satisfied when there is a targeted sample from a known
or suspected crime because the point of testing such a sample is to
see whom the results might incriminate.
Applying that test to machine progenitors, courts should
conclude that the progenitors’ contribution to the test result is not
testimonial. The progenitors of most machines will have designed,
built, and programmed them with no crime, specific sample, or
specific criminal trial in mind. In other words, their work will be, at
best, in anticipation of hypothetical future criminal trials. Thus,
courts should conclude that machine progenitors contribute to the
“speech” of a machine in a way that is too attenuated under the
Confrontation Clause and, in any event, is also not testimonial.
Progenitors are normally not covered by the Confrontation Clause.
It is not hard to imagine exceptions to those general rules.
If a machine or software was designed, programmed, or otherwise
calibrated to investigate a particular event or entity, that could be a
formal action undertaken with the primary purpose of generating
evidence and thus could be considered testimonial. If the
progenitor’s contribution to the machine’s output was also so
significant that the progenitor was essentially a co-author of the
results, that could subject the progenitor to cross-examination. In
the next two sections, that question is addressed directly: when, if
ever, is a human’s contribution (whether from a progenitor or the
machine’s operator) to a machine’s data sufficient to subject the
human to the requirements of the Confrontation Clause?
D. Maintenance and Calibration Records
Maintenance and calibration records fall in the portion of
the spectrum in which humans play an active role in the day-to-day
operation of machines, but where courts should still have no
203. See also Michigan v. Bryant, 131 S. Ct. 1143, 1155 (2011) (describing
the test as whether the statement was for “a primary purpose of creating an outof-court substitute for trial testimony”).
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difficulty concluding that they generally are not subject to the
Confrontation Clause. The first area in this range is records that
establish that a particular machine has been inspected, calibrated,
or otherwise maintained and found to be in proper working order.
Though these records are made as formal assertions that would
normally be used for their truth at trial, courts should conclude
that they generally will not trigger a Confrontation Clause right
because the statements in them are not testimonial.
Many courts that have considered the issue have come to
this conclusion.204 Maintenance and calibration records, when
made as part of a routine process, are created “to ensure the
reliability of such machines—not to secure evidence for use in any
particular criminal proceeding. The fact that the scientific test
results and the observations of the technicians might be relevant to
future prosecutions of unknown defendants [is], at most, an
ancillary consideration . . . .”205 This test might be clearer if the
emphasized words were replaced with “non-hypothetical,” to
clarify the test’s distance from the Williams particular-identifieddefendant requirement. The focus should be on whether there is
an identifiable non-hypothetical use of the statement in a future
criminal trial, not whether that use involves a specific, identified
defendant.
Applying that test, the creator of calibration and
maintenance records can reasonably foresee that the records might
be used in a future case, but the existence of the future case is
purely hypothetical. No case yet exists as to the records being
204. See, e.g., Cranston v. State, 936 N.E.2d 342, 346 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010)
(“[T]his Court has routinely held that Datamaster inspection certificates are nontestimonial documents presenting no confrontation problems of their own.”);
Matthies v. State, 85 So. 3d 838, 844 (Miss.), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 317 (2012)
(concluding that most courts to consider the issue have held that inspection,
maintenance, and calibration records are non-testimonial and collecting cases on
that point); State v. Michaels, 95 A.3d 648, 662 (N.J. 2014) (collecting cases); see
also People v. Pealer, 985 N.E.2d 903, 908 (N.Y. 2013), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct.
105 (2013); People v. Hulbert, 939 N.Y.S.2d 661, 663 (N.Y. App. Div. 2012);
Commonwealth v. Dyarman, 73 A.3d 565, 569 (Pa. 2013), cert. denied, 134 S.
Ct. 948 (2014); John C. O'Brien, The Hearsay Within Confrontation, 29 ST.
LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 501, 521 & n.155 (2010); cf. McCarthy v. State, 285 P.3d
285, 294 (Alaska Ct. App. 2012) (Mannheimer, J., concurring) (collecting cases,
but arguing that calibration results may actually be testimonial); People v. Doe,
959 N.Y.S.2d 839, 844 (Sup. Ct. 2012) (analogizing the physical lifting of a
fingerprint to machine maintenance and calibration records, which “do not
violate a defendant’s Confrontation Rights”).
205. People v. Pealer, 985 N.E.2d 903, 907 (N.Y. 2013) (emphasis added),
cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 105 (2013).
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created; as far as the record-creators know, there has been no
report of a crime, no crime itself, no targeted sample, nor is there—
as connected to calibration or maintenance of the device—a victim,
crime scene, or defendant.206 Because the records lack a nonhypothetical target, they are not accusatorial or testimonial.207
If, however, a technician were to calibrate or inspect a
machine for a specific, non-hypothetical test, the result should
change. Suppose, for example, that a police officer is about to
conduct a breath test at the station and the officer asks the
calibration technician to prepare the breathalyzer. In that situation,
even if the technician does not know who the defendant is, the
prosecutorial wheel has begun to turn and the technician knows it:
there is an alleged crime, and future use is not hypothetical but
instead planned. In that situation, a calibration record has both an
evidentiary character (the device is about to accuse or exculpate a
defendant based largely on the device’s proper calibration and
maintenance) and “the primary purpose of the [creation of the
record] is to establish or prove past events potentially relevant to
later criminal prosecution.”208 The maintenance/calibration record
would thus be testimonial.
E. Humans Operating Machines: Placers, Preparers, and Button-Pushers
Being testimonial is only part of the equation; the
“statements” at issue must actually be subject to the Confrontation
Clause. Are the progenitor’s programming and the technician’s
calibration and maintenance properly encompassed by the
Confrontation Clause, which is concerned with “witnesses” and
those who “bear testimony” against the accused?209 In other words,
is the data generated by a machine the “statement” of the machine,
the humans involved contemporaneously in the creation of the
statement, or both?
206. At any given time, there are presumably crimes that have not yet been
identified or are about to be investigated. However, as to the primary purpose
that the person is calibrating or maintaining the machine, there is no specific
crime or victim at issue. The calibration and maintenance are for general use,
not a specific future use.
207. See, e.g., PAUL C. GIANNELLI ET AL., SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE § 6.04(e)
(Matthew Bender 5th ed. 2013) (noting that intoxilyzer calibration records
created before a suspect is stopped, much less arrested, have a quality-control
function).
208. Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 822; (2006); see also Crawford v.
Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 52 (2004).
209. See, e.g., Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 51 (2004) (quoting 2 N.
WEBSTER, AN AMERICAN DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (1928)).
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That question lies at the heart of the machine-generated
testimony doctrine, and its answer is debatable. Though humans
operate the machines (to varying extents), the machines often do
the heavy lifting in creating the data. Given the machine’s
significant, if not predominant, contribution to the resulting
“statement”—the raw data—most courts have concluded that the
machine is the speaker.210 And if the statements are attributed to
only the machine, the post-Crawford Confrontation Clause
presumably does not apply to them because you cannot, in the
traditional sense, cross-examine or confront a machine.211
However, there are approaches that would attribute some
machine speech to their human assistants. In this section, we
consider three such categories of machine-human pairings: (1)
humans directing the machine at some specific target (a given
sample, a specific area to be recorded, etc.), (2) individuals who
collect and prepare a sample for later analysis, and (3) machines
that produce data with little more than the push of a power or start
button.
Both this section and the next section address not just
operators of machines, but also progenitors and technicians who
create, program, calibrate, or maintain a machine for a specific
anticipated use, such as designing software to infiltrate a particular
network, or calibrating a breathalyzer for a specific, imminent
breath test. In all of these situations, humans contribute to the
imminent use of the machine to generate evidence and, in doing
so, exercise control that, to varying degrees, dictates the
“statement” that the machine will make.
We begin with directing a machine to a specific sample or
area for analysis. Suppose an analyst places a white rock taken
from the defendant—which is suspected to be cocaine—in the
testing machine. Another analyst sets the parameters and runs the
test, and the machine provides data about the rock, but the
machine did so only because someone provided the sample to the
machine. Is directing the machine’s attention to the specific
sample—but doing no more—an action that falls under the
Confrontation Clause?
Most likely not. These actions can be likened to any other
physical action and are primarily non-assertive conduct that,
despite impacting the resulting machine-generated data, are not
within the ambit of the Confrontation Clause’s concern with
210. See supra Part III.
211. See United States v. Moon, 512 F.3d 359, 362 (7th Cir. 2008).
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bearing testimony. Removing the machine from the picture
simplifies the question: if one analyst gave a substance to a second
analyst and, after testing via beakers and boilers, the second
analyst declared that the substance was cocaine, we would not
attribute that declaration of results to the first analyst.212 The same
should be true for individuals providing samples to machines. In
both situations, one person provides the sample to the testing entity
(the second analyst or the automated machine); that action is nonassertive conduct that is at least one step removed from the
creation of the statement. Thus, courts should not attribute data to
an individual who merely directs a machine’s attention to a
sample.
Further, when placing an item in a machine that requires
additional action to display data, the analyst has not yet caused the
machine to make any assertion. If further action is required, such
as pushing the start button, it is the person who actually does so to
whom the statement (arguably) would be attributed.213 In that way,
the mere act of directing a machine’s attention at a sample, but
doing no more, is akin to A handing B a sample for B to test.
Accordingly, courts should reject the claim that the individuals
who placed the sample in the machine (but did no more) are the
co-authors of the raw data the machine produces.
What about individuals who collect a sample from the
crime scene or prepare the sample for analysis at a later time?
They should not trigger a Confrontation Clause right because, if all
they do is collect and prepare evidence, they have not made any
assertions. They collect the sample or prepare it so someone else
may make an assertion about it. If, however, the collectors and
preparers create certificates or the equivalent in the course of
collecting and preparing items, those statements may be
testimonial and covered by the Clause. However, simply collecting
and preparing evidence through physical actions does appear, on
its face, to be assertive conduct.214
212. As indicated earlier in this Part, we might attribute other things to the
first analyst, though. Suppose the first analyst wrote the defendant’s name on the
evidence bag for the white rock. When the second analyst learns the defendant’s
name from that bag and then repeats it in the second analyst’s report, we should
attribute the statement in part to the first analyst.
213. If the machine displays data automatically, such as on a scale that
automatically displays weight without further intervention, then that action is
akin to the next category: operators who generate data by merely pushing the
equivalent of a start button on a machine.
214. Cf. Jennifer Mnookin & David Kaye, Confronting Science: Expert
Evidence and the Confrontation Clause, 2012 SUP. CT. REV. 99, 152 (2012)
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Whether that mere button-pusher should be deemed a coauthor of the machine’s statement is our final question in this
section. In this category of machines, the operator’s contribution to
the resulting raw data is limited to putting the sample in the
machine (which we have already considered) and pushing start. In
this situation, courts again are widely in agreement that the
resulting data is a “statement” by the machine, which is not
covered by the Confrontation Clause.215
That result is consistent with the cases rejecting application
of the Confrontation Clause to photographs, videos, and
interpreters.216 If there is no right to cross-examine the person who
pushed the camera’s start-button-equivalent (and potentially even
made subjective decisions about angle, lighting, lens use, etc.), it
would be incongruent if there were a right to cross-examine an
analyst who pushed the start button on an automated forensic
machine. Similarly, if there is no right to cross-examine an
interpreter—who actually makes subjective decisions in
translating217—why would there be a right to cross-examine an
analyst who made no such decisions?
The result also makes some intuitive sense: the operator
exercises no control over the machine’s creation of data, and so
the proper parties to be viewed as a co-author of the machine’s
assertions are the machine’s progenitors—they exercised the
relevant control over the machine’s speech, to which the operator
contributed nothing. The progenitors are the source of the
assertion, but their contribution is (as described previously)
attenuated and nontestimonial. Though courts’ common references
to the machine being the witness in such situations are technically
incorrect—it would be better to say the progenitors are the ones
making the assertion—the result is the same: no person making an
assertion acted in a testimonial manner, and the machine (to
whatever extent it is viewed as a separate entity from the
progenitors, perhaps as a sum of the parts) is not subject to
confrontation under Crawford.
Finally, there are some instances where the operator’s
contribution to the resulting assertion would not be testimonial. If a
store manager installed a surveillance camera and aimed it at the
(“[V]irtually no one who has thought about the intersection of forensic science
and the Confrontation Clause thinks [calling, e.g., roughly a dozen analysts
involved in a DNA test to testify] makes sense.”).
215. See supra Part III.
216. See supra Part IV.
217. See United States v. Charles, 722 F.3d 1319, 1324-25 (11th Cir. 2013).
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cash register, the resulting videos would fall into this category: a
machine, with little-to-no human interaction beyond the manager
setting the machine in motion, would generate data. The
manager’s initiation of the recording process would usually not be
testimonial because, although the manager might intend to create
evidence that could be used in a future trial (such as to catch a
future robber), he or she would not have a non-hypothetical use in
mind (unless there was, for instance, a recent history of cash
register shortages the manager specifically intended to catch). Even
assuming that the manager did have an evidence-generation
purpose in mind, setting up a camera in your own store is arguably
not sufficiently formal or solemn to be testimonial (especially in
Justice Thomas’s eyes). Thus, the resulting video feed should be
deemed neither the statement of the manager who installed it nor
testimonial. Courts are on defensible ground in concluding that
data produced by a human operator that essentially pushed a
“start” button is immune from the Clause’s requirements of
confrontation and cross-examination.
This result renders a significant number of machines
immune to the Confrontation Clause. For all machines that are
sufficiently automated that the operator need only push start, there
will be no right to confront or cross-examine that operator nor, for
the reasons discussed earlier, most anyone else involved at a prior
stage.
F. Humans Operating Machines: Humans Exercising Control
All that remains is the category of machines where there is
some level of human control beyond simply setting the device in
motion. This area poses the most difficult Confrontation Clause
questions for machine-generated data. Through selecting the
parameters of the test, choosing how the data will be displayed,
and controlling the machine in other ways, some operators greatly
shape the assertion the machine will make. Thus, courts could
consider the machine and operator as co-authors of the resulting
statement. Just as an interpreter’s translations are often attributed to
the defendant and a dog’s handler is seen as the key witness for a
dog’s alert,218 so too—either as a matter of logic or as a legal
fiction—could a machine’s data be attributed to its handlers (or
otherwise require their testimony). Progenitors, calibrators, and
maintenance technicians who prepare a device for a specific
218. See infra pp. 57-58. However, as discussed later in this Part, it is
somewhat problematic to rely on these other doctrines.
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investigation could be placed in this same category because they
similarly shape a machine’s data by preparing the machine for a
specific, non-hypothetical use.
On the other hand, choosing the parameters of the test,
selecting the way the data will be displayed, and other such actions
are physical actions that, viewed in isolation, will often be nonassertive conduct. Why should non-assertive conduct that creates—
but does not define the contents of—assertions be attributed to the
non-assertive actor? Given that the machine or its progenitors
define the contents of the assertion, courts could conclude that they
are the only declarant, not the human operator. Courts are on
strong ground in reaching this alternative conclusion, and they
could draw support from the photo, video, and interpreter cases in
rejecting a right to confront the machine’s operator.
At the heart of the debate between these two dueling
conclusions is the determination of whether controlling a machine
for the purpose of making an assertion—but via actions that are
themselves non-assertive—exposes human assistants to the
Confrontation Clause. The amount of control the human assistant
exercises will vary from machine to machine, and the amount of
control is important: if the operator is not exercising “sufficient”
control, attributing the assertion to the operator would be solely a
fiction. However, where operating decisions are made by a human
controller and are made for the express purpose of generating an
assertion, the resulting assertion could be attributed, in part, to the
operator. The human is, after all, using the machine for that
express purpose: to generate an assertion about the sample. On
that basis, courts could view that resulting assertion (the data) as
partially attributable to the human. The statement is also partially
the machine’s. But, because the statement is partially attributable to
the human assistant, the defendant would have a right to confront
and cross-examine that individual.
It is difficult to compare this model to examples outside the
machine-generated phenomenon. If Carl, through threats and
extortion, coerced Dan not to tell police anything about Carl’s
involvement in a crime, Carl would be exercising some control
over Dan. When Dan gave a statement to the police, if we knew
that Dan was altering the story because of the threat, we might
consider Dan’s statement as partially a product of Carl’s control—as
partially attributable to Carl speaking through Dan even though
Dan has not repeated any of Carl’s statements. But it is doubtful
that a defendant would have a right to cross-examine Carl just
because Dan subsequently told a story that Carl influenced. In this
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example, that lack of a right to cross-examine Carl is only
strengthened by the fact that Carl did not tell Dan what specific
story to tell, and thus many of the details in the resulting story were
not directly shaped by Carl. Dan also exercised his own judgment
in deciding whether to obey Carl’s orders. The lack of an ability to
cross-examine Carl in this scenario might indicate that there is
similarly no right to cross-examine a human assistant who merely
shapes a machine’s data.
But machines are much more affected by their controllers
than Dan. If an operator decides to run one test or display results
in one way, the machine generally cannot do otherwise. This is not
a matter of whether the operator has made a good decision or bad
decision, such as running the wrong test. Nor does it matter
whether, at a later date, someone could look at the raw data and
see that the incorrect test was run. What matters is that the story is
not just the machine’s; the machine has yielded, and must yield,
important decisions to the operator, and thus the resulting data is
not solely the product of the machine (or those who manufactured
and maintained it). In that situation, the raw data is at least in part
the product of multiple authors, including the machine and the
operator.219
As another comparative exercise, operating the machine
could be likened to interrogation because the operator, by either
pushing start or setting the operating parameters, effectively asks
the machine the question that prompts it to generate a statement in
response. Just as an interrogator’s non-assertive question usually
shapes the answer given, so too does the operator of a machine
direct the machine, through non-assertive physical actions, towards
a category of answers.220 However, in the context of a conversation
or even an interrogation, though the question directs the
declarant’s attention to a topic, the statement in response is still a
distinct item. The question might need to be admitted as evidence
for other reasons, such as to give proper context to the answer, but
that does not make the question part of the answer. If the question
to a witness is not part of the witness’s answer, it could be
reasonable to view a “question” to the machine—setting the
219. As described earlier, the data is also the product of the progenitors
and technicians who calibrated, maintained, etc., the device. Their contributions,
however, will normally not be testimonial (and might be too attenuated to be
deemed assertions).
220. As voice-recognition technology improves, analysts might even
conduct forensic analysis by asking machines questions or giving them vocal
commands.
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operating parameters or pushing start—as not part of the machine’s
answer either.
On the other hand, unlike a declarant answering a question
where the possible responses are limitless, a machine “chooses” its
answer from a limited number of choices dictated by how the
machine was programmed. In this sense, the machine is much
more heavily influenced by the question the operator poses than is
the person interrogated by a police officer. Further, it is debatable
whether the answer given to a question (whether the answer comes
from a machine or a person) is really separate from the question;
the answer could be said to incorporate the question. If I ask you
where you were at 5:00 p.m. on October 10th, your answer of “at
the track” incorporates the question and is understood as “at 5:00
p.m. on October 10th, I was at the track.”221 Similarly, the fairly
leading question posed by some operators of machines could be
said to be incorporated in the answer the machine gives. However,
once again, it seems unlikely that a defendant would have the right
to confront and cross-examine an interrogator who posed only
non-assertive questions that shaped the declarant’s answers.222
Though there is no perfect analog elsewhere in the Confrontation
Clause for the work that a machine does, these exercises suggest
that any attribution of the machine’s data to the human assistants
would be rather sui generis (as with interpreters and dog handlers)
and arguably a legal fiction.
Adopting, for now, the proposition that this attribution is
appropriate, how much operator control would be enough to
trigger it? There are at least two different ways to fence-off this
area: (1) humans exercising a certain threshold of control over the
machine’s output, or (2) a standard requiring that humans make
subjective decisions that affect the analysis. If subjective decisionmaking is enough to deem the human a co-author of the machine’s
raw data, then button-pushers may cross that threshold when they
decide which machine or tool they will use to run the test. For
example, if, hypothetically, a test using litmus paper would
produce equivalent results to those produced by a machine that
221. Cf. Michigan v. Bryant, 131 S. Ct. 1143, 1160-61 (2011) (“In many
instances, the primary purpose of the interrogation will be most accurately
ascertained by looking to the contents of both the questions and the answers. To
give an extreme example, if the police say to a victim, ‘Tell us who did this to
you so that we can arrest and prosecute them,’ the victim's response that ‘Rick
did it,’ appears purely accusatory because by virtue of the phrasing of the
question, the victim necessarily has prosecution in mind when she answers.”).
222. Cf. id. at 1160 n.11 (“An interrogator's questions, unlike a declarant's
answers, do not assert the truth of any matter.”).
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requires only the push of a button, deciding to use the machine
over the litmus paper is a subjective decision about the analysis.
Yet, for the reasons discussed previously, it is arguably problematic
to attribute the raw data to the operator when the operator merely
pushed start. Among other problems, the analyst has exercised no
control over the analytical tool used, she has simply chosen which
tool to “ask.”
That problem is less significant if the test is whether the
operator exercised a certain level of control over the machine’s
output. Simply selecting a machine exercises no control over that
machine’s assertion process; it exercises control over the data on
the macro level, but not on the micro level as to that machine’s
actual method of making the assertion. In other words, it might
change the results, but not because it changes how the specific
machine “speaks.” Similarly, those who prepare a sample exercise
control over the resulting data, but they do not exercise control
over the testing machine directly, which is used at a later step.
Changing the sample before it reaches the machine, such as by
contaminating it or swapping in a different substance, changes the
right answer, and the machine (which is designed to give the
answer that correctly mirrors reality, e.g., what the sample is
actually made of) has changed its assertion accordingly. But it does
not change how the machine makes that assertion. Thus, neither
simply choosing a machine nor preparing a sample would be
sufficient to deem the operator or preparer a co-author of the raw
data.
A control-based test also better models when a statement
should be attributed to multiple sources: it is more reasonable to
do so when one of the sources exercises control over the other’s
statement than when one simply exercises subjective judgment that
somehow affects the resulting statement. Further, focusing on
control avoids another problem: if lab protocols or scientific
principles specify how a test should be run, confusion could arise
when following those pre-defined rules—would that be subjective
decision-making by the analyst?
Suppose, however, that a lab supervisor seeking to duck
the threshold of a control test designated two GC-MS machines as
“the GC-MS that operates at temperature X” and “the GC-MS for
temperature Y.” Suppose also that selecting the temperature range
used in a GC-MS is a decision that exercises sufficient control over
the raw data to meet the control test. In that situation, an operator
would choose the machine based on the preferred temperature,
thereby exercising control over the data on the macro level, but
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would fall short of the threshold for exercising control on the micro
level (over the specific GC-MS’s analysis, which the analyst has not
changed at all because each GC-MS is already set to use the
desired parameter).
That result is acceptable under the control test because the
goal is not to artificially capture all machine data, but to capture
only the data where the machine is not the only “speaker.” If I
choose whether to ask a friend who is a staunch Democrat for
advice on who to vote for instead of a friend who is a Republican,
I have exercised (on the macro level) more than de minimis
control over the answer I will receive even though I have exercised
almost no control (on the micro level) over what the chosen friend
will say. So, too, if I ask a former boss who fired me—instead of a
former boss who promoted me—to write me a letter of
recommendation. In these examples, as with choosing the
“temperature Y” GC-MS over the “temperature X” GC-MS, the
resulting speaker is not controlled, though the resulting data is.223
To the extent that we might seek a way to address control
over the data on the macro level, the Confrontation Clause—which
asks who is the relevant declarant on the micro level—does not
help. If it did—if the relevant question was “who is exercising
sufficient control over the resulting data”—then the parties who
cross that threshold would include individuals who are potentially
several steps removed from the operator-analyst’s actual use of the
machine. The list would include those who collected the evidence,
others in the chain of custody, and individuals who prepared a
sample for testing.224 That result is problematic for the reasons
noted earlier in this Part, and it would also be in tension with the
Court’s view of the Confrontation Clause in Melendez-Diaz.225

223. If the lab supervisor changed the parameters for the machines for a
specific, non-hypothetical test, the result would change. In that situation, the
supervisor would be a co-author by exercising control over a specific nonhypothetical statement. By setting the GC-MS machines at fixed temperatures for
all uses, the lab supervisor acts more like a calibrator than an operator because
the supervisor is preparing the machines for foreseeable, but only hypothetical,
use as opposed to any specific sample, investigation, or crime.
224. For example, Justice Breyer included a summary of DNA lab work
preparation in Williams. See Williams v. Illinois, 132 S. Ct. 2221, 2245 (2012)
(Breyer, J., concurring).
225. See, e.g., Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 557 U.S. 305, 311 n.1
(“[W]e do not hold, and it is not the case, that anyone whose testimony may be
relevant in establishing the chain of custody, authenticity of the sample, or
accuracy of the testing device, must appear in person as part of the prosecution’s
case.”).
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But how much control is enough? Should it be “more than
de minimis” control? Substantial control? Some other threshold? A
“more than de minimis” approach is a threshold that courts
already use in other contexts, and it makes some sense to the
extent that de minimis contributions by the operator-analyst do not
shape the machine’s data, thereby leaving the machine/progenitors
as the only declarant(s).226 However, that result would still require
imprecise case-by-case testing for each machine, and the “de
minimis” threshold answers the “how much is enough” question
somewhat arbitrarily. Whatever the threshold is, it will raise
difficult questions; for example, if an analyst selects the
magnification level for an electron microscope’s printed images of
a sample, is that enough control? Is choosing the unit of
measurement, such as pounds instead of kilograms, de minimis?
As an alternative approach, courts could look to the
“language conduit” interpreter cases under one of several
analogies. Just as there is no right to cross-examine the interpreter,
who is merely a conduit through which language passes and is
translated, so too would there be no right to cross-examine the
operator, who is merely a conduit for the proper operation of the
machine. Under that theory, courts would attribute to the machine
the operator’s contribution in the same way that they attribute the
interpreter’s contribution to the defendant. Alternatively, the
sample could be viewed as continually asserting its properties in a
language that requires translation (“My BAC is 10%.”), and the
machine and operator would be merely a conduit for translating
that information to a form that can be used in court. A DNA
sample, for example, is already the defendant’s DNA profile or
not; if we could perceive it in the way the translator (the machine)
does, we would know the answer without any analysis.
Applying a language-conduit-style theory to machinegenerated data would, as it does with interpreters, leave open the
possibility that defendants would be entitled to cross-examine
operators who did not act as a mere conduit for normal operation
of the machine. This test would also filter out humans
communicating through machines, e.g. via word processors,
because the operator would then be acting as more than a mere
conduit. However, this approach presumably would not use the
actual factors from the language conduit cases as they pertain to
226. See United States v. Lamons, 532 F.3d 1251, 1264 n.23 (11th Cir. 2008)
(“[C]ertain statements involve so little intervention by humans in their generation
as to leave no doubt that they are wholly machine-generated for all practical
purposes.”).
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seemingly unrelated issues, e.g. whether the parties acted in a
manner consistent with the translation. A language conduit
approach should also omit that doctrine’s use of notions of
reliability: relying on the reliability of the translator (or machine)
and whether the translator (operator-analysts) had any motive to
fabricate would be in tension with the post-Crawford Confrontation
Clause that is divorced from assurances of reliability.227 However,
even as revised, this test would raise the difficult case-by-case
questions that plague the control test. And, like the control test, it
depends on the underlying theory that the non-assertive actions by
some human assistants merits deeming them co-authors of the
statement merely because the purpose of using the machine is to
generate an assertion.
Both the control test and conduit test could also have
unexpected breadth. For example, suppose a burglar broke into a
building and, in the course of doing so, cut a padlock. A suspect is
brought into custody along with his cutting shears. A forensic
analyst receives the cut lock and the shears and, using the same
brand of lock, cuts the lock to compare the tool marks to those on
the lock from the crime scene. Are the tool marks left on the test
lock the statement of that analyst? The analyst merely undertook a
physical process, selecting and cutting the lock, and has not yet
compared them. The tool marks are functionally “raw data” from
the shears, and the analyst is the operator of that tool. Are the raw
data tool marks to be considered an assertion by the analyst?
The control test might answer yes to that question. The
analyst exercised control over the intensity and frequency of the
force used in the cutting (e.g. one hard push versus multiple
cumulative pushes), and did so in an arguably formal setting (a lab
undertaking investigation into a known crime) for the purpose of
generating evidence that could be used in a future trial. Although
cutting tools are not machines in the normal sense of that word,
they are not so different in complexity from other things that are,
such as an analog scale or a thermometer.
That problem, assuming it is a problem, could be
addressed with a new requirement: devices, to qualify for the sui
generis machine-generated data exception, must (a) be designed to
make assertions about reality, and (b) have been used in that
227. See, e.g., United States v. Blazier, 69 M.J. 218, 223 (C.A.A.F. 2010)
(“While ‘reliability’ is the end, the right of confrontation is the means, and it is
the means (rather than the end) that the Sixth Amendment insists upon.”); cf.
United States v. Charles, 722 F.3d 1319 (11th Cir. 2013) (reconsidering and
criticizing the language conduit theory in light of Crawford).
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assertive capacity for the data at issue. That definitional limitation
would exclude tool marks from many tools because they are not
made for the purpose of generating assertions about reality. But,
without that definitional limitation, the control test and even the
conduit test could encompass the assertive physical actions that do
not involve classic assertive machines. For some, that flexibility
would be a strength. For others, it sinks the entire theory of
attributing raw data to human operators because the tests sweep in
too much.
Perhaps because of the difficulty in line-drawing, judges
have, with few exceptions, concluded that essentially all machinegenerated data does not trigger the Confrontation Clause.228 That
approach is defensible. First, it is the cleaner line to draw in the
sand as it is easy to apply: all machine data, minus examples such
as the word processor letter, are deemed statements of machines.
Second, by emphasizing in Bullcoming that the analyst there
certified “more than a machine-generated number,” the Court
arguably suggested that the machine-generated number was not
concerning under the Confrontation Clause.229 Third, the parallel
cases on videos and photographs offer an additional column of
support, though it is limited support because these cases are often
based in part on the idea that photos and videos are merely
demonstrative evidence.230 That premise is debatable when
pictures and videos—such as of the crime, the victim’s wounds, and
of the crime scene—serve as substantive evidence of guilt that goes
beyond accompanying testimony.
A stronger argument that machine assistants are not subject
to confrontation and cross-examination is the fact that the data
produced by machines is the result of a physical process external
to the machine operators. A GC-MS is simply a tool, albeit a
sophisticated one, and the results of its analysis depend upon a
series of physical, non-assertive steps. The results of other physical
non-assertive processes are not usually seen as “statements” of the
person that initiated them.231 And just as a non-assertive question is

228. See supra Part III.
229. Bullcoming v. New Mexico, 131 S. Ct. 2705, 2715 (2011); see also THE
NEW WIGMORE: EXPERT EVIDENCE, supra note 25, § 4.12.5.
230. See supra Part IV.
231. As one commentator described this argument, “at a theoretical level, it
is hard to distinguish most of the records deemed to be computer-generated
from footprints left in the mud outside the scene of a crime.” Erick J. Poorbaugh,
Interfacing Your Accuser: Computerized Evidence and the Confrontation
Clause Following Melendez-Diaz, 23 REGENT U. L. REV. 213, 226 (2011).
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distinct from an answer, so too are the human assistants’ nonassertive physical actions distinct from the machine’s assertion.
Thus, courts are on strong ground in concluding that,
except as to humans communicating through machines, machines
are the real declarants and the Confrontation Clause does not
reach them. Courts could adhere to that path because: (1) the
operator contribution to most machines is de minimis; (2) the
courts reject the premise that non-assertive actions made to enable
another to make an assertion render the operator a co-author; or
(3) drawing lines for sufficient operator involvement is difficult and
potentially arbitrary, and the Supreme Court has cautioned against
Confrontation Clause tests that are too malleable.232
This result is the status quo and, though constitutionally
sound, is disconcerting. It reduces the amount of exposure analysts
have to cross-examination and confrontation because, instead of a
constitutional right to confront and question analysts, there are only
evidentiary rights of lesser potency that, as seen in Roberts and
indicated in Crawford, are less predictable and easier to satisfy in
ways that do not involve the analyst who is most likely to know if
he or she ran the right test, followed procedures, cut corners,
fabricated the evidence, etc.233 Cross-examination has exposed
some forensic errors, and there are forensic errors—both from
sloppy work and from malfeasance—to expose.234 Surrogate
analysts are not a reliable way to catch those errors because, unless
the surrogates are complicit in the inadequacy or malfeasance they
will not know about those issues (and if they are complicit, the
surrogate surely will not reveal that fact). A broad shield against
cross-examining the only people who are likely to know about
errors and fraud is in tension with the Supreme Court’s concerns in
Melendez-Diaz and Bullcoming that forensic results are powerful
evidence that is sometimes flawed and should be subject to crossexamination.235
Further, as machines become increasingly automated, the
Confrontation Clause will shrink further under the status quo
model. There is little limit to what machines will be able to do in
232. Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 61 (2004).
233. States could also interpret their constitution in a manner creating such
a constitutional right, but unless the state constitutions contained a different-inscope confrontation clause, they could meet the same problems that led courts
to conclude the federal Confrontation Clause does not encompass machinegenerated data.
234. See supra note 8.
235. See, e.g., Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 557 U.S. 305, 318-19 (2009);
Bullcoming v. New Mexico, 131 S. Ct. 2705, 2714-15 (2011).
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time, and they already do many tasks that were once accomplished
by human analysts that would have been subject to crossexamination.236 It is not difficult to imagine a lab where evidence
collected from the crime scene by a forensic drone is tagged with a
digital marker and fed through a series of automated machines in
an assembly line of analysis, producing data with minimal human
oversight. Again, that outcome is not inherently bad—it might
decrease both errors and opportunities for malfeasance—but it
would, under a model that treats all machine-generated data as the
statement of a machine, reduce further the utility of the
Confrontation Clause as it pertains to forensic science, which is
often an important piece of trials for the most serious criminal
matters. That result is inconsistent with the Court’s apparent desire
in Davis to prevent the Confrontation Clause from having an
expiration date237 and the principles expressed by the majority in
Melendez-Diaz and Bullcoming.238 An alternative model that
declines to categorically classify data from forensic machines as
machine-generated would be more in line with the purpose of the
Confrontation Clause.239
Perhaps the only clear non-arbitrary boundary that can be
drawn is between humans communicating through machines (e.g.,
writing letters in a word processor) and humans using machines for
everything else. What that approach gains in simplicity it loses in
flexibility, and it would be just as easy to attribute all machine data
to the humans who pushed start or set the parameters. However,
both approaches fail to respond, as categorical rules, to the variety
of machines and levels of control operators exercise from case to
case.
A case-by-case approach would be more protective of the
right to confrontation. By attributing machine-generated testimony
to the controlling analysts, the model would preserve the right to
cross-examine some analysts and thereby potentially expose their
errors. It would also recognize that forensic machines are simply
sophisticated tools that humans use to make assertions about the
236. See, e.g., supra notes 3-6 (noting machine advances).
237. See Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 830 n.5 (2006) (“Restricting the
Confrontation Clause to the precise forms against which it was originally
directed is a recipe for its extinction.”).
238. See supra note 8 (listing the many examples of forensic errors and
fabrication).
239. Cf. State v. Lopez, 45 A.3d 1, 18-19 (R.I. 2012) (analyzing the extent to
which an allele table depicting information about DNA analysis was created by
an analyst based on machine-generated data as opposed to data generated by a
machine an analyst operated).
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world. If analysis was pursued with chemistry vials, would the
resulting data be statements of the beakers and solutions that the
chemist used? In that regard, and in light of the ever-increasing
capabilities of automated forensic analysis, this approach would
also extend the lifespan of the Confrontation Clause.
The Confrontation Clause offers no clear answer to the
question of attribution for machine-generated data. Both
approaches described herein—either attributing machine-generated
data to human agents or declining to do so and attributing the data
to only the machine or its progenitors—are defensible. By
attributing some machine-generated data to the controlling
analysts, courts could preserve the function of the Confrontation
Clause despite the increase in semi-automated machines. That
result is consistent with the purposes of the Clause as well. Courts,
however, have taken the other path, and the reach of the
Confrontation Clause has contracted meaningfully.
G. Flawed Counterarguments for Machine-Generated Testimony
Although there are difficult questions surrounding the
machine-generated testimony doctrine, some questions should not
be seen as presenting the difficulty that courts sometimes ascribe to
them. Three such issues warrant brief mention. They are the
theory that: (1) the analyst who operated the machine had no way
of knowing that the results would implicate the defendant, and thus
the data was not testimony “against an accused” under the
Confrontation Clause,240 (2) there would be no value in crossexamining analysts who perform hundreds of tests and are unlikely
to recall any particular one,241 and (3) analysts could not testify to
anything except how they ran the tests because it was the machines
that made the actual statements about the results.242
Courts should not find these claims persuasive. First, the
fact that an analyst does not know the result of the test in a
criminal case does not change that it is a test run to generate
240. See People v. Doe, 959 N.Y.S.2d 839, 843 (Sup. Ct. 2012) (“[H]ere, the
criminalist who lifted the print and who was unavailable, or any other criminalist
who could have lifted the print, would have no way of knowing that it would
later implicate defendant as having his prints on the note.”).
241. See, e.g., People v. Lopez, 286 P.3d 469, 480-81 (Cal. 2012) (Werdegar,
J., concurring, joined by three other California Justices) (addressing annotations
made by lab assistants).
242. See, e.g., People v. Brown, 918 N.E.2d 927, 931-32 (N.Y. 2009) (“These
technicians would not have been able to offer any testimony other than how
they performed certain procedures.”).
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evidence for foreseeable use at a criminal trial. All evidence tends
to incriminate some and exculpate others. That evidence is
exculpatory to some (because the fingerprint or DNA profile
identified does not match one suspect’s biometrics) does not
change that it incriminates the true perpetrator simultaneously. For
this reason and those noted in discussing the Williams plurality’s
“targeted” test, courts should not find this counter-argument
persuasive.
Next, although someone who performs any task hundreds
of times is unlikely to remember a specific performance, he will
remember if he routinely fabricates data or fails to follow testing
procedures, and the specter of potential cross-examination will
help dissuade some from doing either. Thus, to the extent that
courts consider policy and practicality considerations under the
Confrontation Clause, this counter-argument is not persuasive
because the ability to cross-examine and confront the operatoranalyst will have benefits.
Finally, for similar reasons, the argument that the only thing
the analyst can testify to is his or her testing procedures (because
the machine made the statements) is not persuasive. That “only
thing” is exactly why the analyst’s testimony is needed. The analyst
can say whether he or she followed procedure or fabricated
evidence, either specifically or as a general matter, and can also
indicate his or her competency. The analyst need not be
intentionally sloppy to realize on the stand that he or she made a
mistake; even a careful analyst, under the crucible of crossexamination, might realize that a different path was required.
Again, to the extent policy and practicality considerations matter,
this counter-argument is not persuasive.
H. The Problem of Source and Implicit Assertions
Suppose a court concludes that machine-generated data is
not a statement to which the Confrontation Clause applies or that
such data is not testimonial. At least two problems remain in
admitting the raw data: what specific person or object is its data
about, and does the data include an implicit assertion by the
operating analyst? The data, to the extent that it is purely machinegenerated, cannot reveal source information: a human’s assertion
that the data pertains to, e.g., blood sample XYZ is often required.
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Some courts have noted this problem of source,243 but not all of
them view it as problematic under the Confrontation Clause.244
An assertion that the data came from testing a specific
sample will be testimonial in many cases because it will be made to
link a sample to forensic tests run in the context of generating
evidence pertaining to a non-hypothetical crime. Accordingly, even
where no Confrontation Clause right arises as to the machinegenerated data, the prosecution should generally need to proffer a
witness who can attest, from first-hand knowledge, that the data
came from testing the specific sample at issue.245 Similarly, if the
prosecutor wants to show that the sample was still sealed
immediately before it was tested, that proper testing protocols were
actually followed during the test, etc., the data, if machinegenerated, cannot do so today—a human must so assert, and that
assertion will often be testimonial. The obvious person to call for

243. See, e.g., People v. Lopez, 286 P.3d 469, 494 (Cal. 2012) (Liu, J.,
dissenting) (“[The surrogate analyst who testified at court] purported to offer his
own independent analysis of the gas chromatography results. But his testimony
had no value without the critical link between defendant’s blood sample and the
test results.”); Young v. United States, 63 A.3d 1033, 1038 (D.C. Cir. 2013)
(“[A]ll [the testifying supervisor, who was not present during the testing,] could
say from personal knowledge was that she compared electropherograms
[machine-generated data] and they matched; she could not say from personal
knowledge whose electropherograms they were or how they were derived.”);
United States v. Drayton, Criminal No. PWG-13-0251, 2014 WL 2919792, at *11
(D. Md. June 26, 2014) (concluding the testifying supervisor—who did not run
the tests at issue—appeared to lack “the requisite knowledge to tie [the
defendant] to the Sample” and recommending that “in the future the
Government would be wise to provide a witness with personal knowledge of the
provenance of materials on which an expert relies”); see also State v. Ortiz-Zape,
743 S.E.2d 156, 170 (N.C. 2013) (Hudson, J., dissenting), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct.
2660 (2014); Cranston v. State, 936 N.E.2d 342, 345-46 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010); THE
NEW WIGMORE: EXPERT EVIDENCE, supra note 25, § 4.12.5.
244. See Lopez, 286 P.3d at 478-79 (concluding that information pertaining
to the “Booking #,” “Lab Number,” “Sample Sealed,” “Subject’s Name,” and
“Arresting Officer,” was not testimonial under the Confrontation Clause because
it was not sufficiently formal or solemn as the analysts involved had not “signed,
certified, or swor[n] to the truth of the contents” and the report said “FOR LAB
USE ONLY”). This result is problematic. Forensic analysis undertaken in
connection with investigation into a crime—and especially analysis that expressly
notes that there is an arresting officer and therefore directly relate to the
potential loss of liberty for someone—is not unlike interrogation.
245. See, e.g., Richard Friedman, Thoughts on Melendez-Diaz: The
Product of Machines, THE CONFRONTATION BLOG (Dec. 18, 2008, 1:43 AM),
http://confrontationright.blogspot.com/2008/12/thoughts-on-melendez-diazproduct-of.html (discussing these problems as “the input proposition” and “the
output proposition”).
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these purposes is the operator-analyst who unsealed the sample,
ran the test, followed procedures, and ultimately produced the
data.
Next, are there implicit testimonial assertions by the analystoperator in the raw data an analyst submits to a supervisor or
court? If, for example, an analyst using a forensic machine submits
data about a sample, a court could conclude that the submission of
the data implicitly asserts that it is about the sample at issue and
that it is not somehow fraudulent. These assertions would,
presumably, be more pronounced and solemn where the operator
signaled his or her approval of the data, such as by signing or
initialing it. Courts are not in agreement on the validity of this
proposition, however.246 Notably, if the data is an implicit assertion
by the non-testifying operator, it will also often be testimonial
because it was prepared to analyze a specific sample that is
relevant to a criminal investigation.
This argument could find limited support in other areas of
Confrontation Clause jurisprudence. First, if an interpreter
implicitly asserts that his or her translation of the statements at issue
is accurate,247 a lab analyst who produces data from operating a
machine could be said to implicitly assert that he or she produced
accurate results. As the Eleventh Circuit stated in Curbelo, a case
addressing that issue for interpreters, “[w]e doubt the prosecution
in Bullcoming or Melendez–Diaz could have avoided the
246. Compare Young v. United States, 63 A.3d 1033, 1046 (D.C. Cir. 2013)
(“[T]he [data at issue] do[es] not stand on [its] own but, instead, ha[s] meaning
because [it] amount[s] to a communication by the scientists who produced [it]—
the assertion, essentially, that the scientists generated these specific results by
properly performing certain tests and procedures on particular, uncorrupted
evidence and correctly recording the outcomes.”) with Lopez, 286 P.3d at 478
(emphasis added):
Turning first to the laboratory report's pages 2 through 6,
they consist entirely of data generated by a gas
chromatography machine to measure calibrations, quality
control, and the concentration of alcohol in a blood
sample. Even though nontestifying analyst Peña’s signature
appears on the laboratory report’s second page (the
printout of the machine's calibrations) and the remaining
pages bear the handwritten initials “JRP” (presumably
Jorge Peña’s initials), no statement by Peña, express or
implied, appears on any of those pages.
247. See United States v. Curbelo, 726 F.3d 1260, 1272-73 (11th Cir. 2013),
cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 962 (2014) (addressing this point as to an interpreter’s
translation).

2014]

RISE OF THE MACHINES

97

Confrontation Clause simply by admitting the numeric or chemical
results of the blood-alcohol or cocaine tests without an analyst’s
certification about how he arrived at those results.”248
Some courts have reached a similar conclusion. As one
court stated, “it is too simplistic to say th[at a machine-generated]
printout of” DNA profiles and related information “were not
hearsay because they were nothing more than raw data produced
by a machine. ‘[D]ata that appears to be produced by a machine
may depend on inputs that require judgment or permit
subjectivity, and these inputs may well be appropriately
characterized as testimonial [hearsay].’”249 Machine-generated
results “do not stand on their own but, instead, have meaning
because they amount to a communication by the scientists who
produced them—the assertion, essentially, that the scientists
generated these specific results by properly performing certain tests
and procedures on particular, uncorrupted evidence and correctly
recording the outcomes.”250
However, this “implicit-assertion” approach reaches too far.
If a custodian of record produces a compilation of relevant
records, the same rationale could lead courts to conclude that the
custodian implicitly asserted that the records were the only relevant
items. Or, a technician who pulled recorded inmate phone calls for
a criminal proceeding could be required to testify because that
technician implicitly asserted that those were the only relevant

248. Id. at 1273. However, Curbelo’s support is limited by the court’s
conclusion in that case that the translator’s implicit assertion that the translation
was accurate was not shared with the jury, even though the transcripts were
introduced at trial. Id. at 1274. The Eleventh Circuit’s conclusion here is strange.
If the interpreter’s assertion that the translation is accurate is implicit in the
translation itself, see id. at 1272 (“The translator's only assertion in the transcripts
is his or her implicit statement that the translation was accurate.”) (first emphasis
added), and the translated transcript was admitted as evidence, id. at 1265 (“the
Government provided the jury an English-language transcript”), then that
implicit assertion of accuracy is also before the jury in the translation itself.
Perhaps Curbelo was simply a harmless error holding, the idea that the implicit
assertion of accuracy was insignificant because another participant/defendant in
the conversations reviewed them and testified to their accuracy, but the court
did not so describe its holding in concluding that “the transcripts’ admission did
not violate the Confrontation Clause.” But see id. at 1274 (“Here, by contrast,
the Government did not introduce the transcripts on the weight of the
translator’s certification, but on Diaz’s testimony.”).
249. Young, 63 A.3d at 1046 (quoting THE NEW WIGMORE: EXPERT
EVIDENCE, supra note 25, § 4.12.5) (alterations in original) (internal quotation
marks and footnotes omitted).
250. Id.
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calls.251 It could even lead to the right to cross-examine individuals
who undertake more ministerial or mechanical actions in a forensic
setting,252 such as extracting a substance to be analyzed from a
sample253 because, in that process, the technicians could be said to
implicitly assert that the result was not fabricated or otherwise in
breach of lab protocols. However, requiring testimony from all of
these individuals would be in tension with the Court’s observation
in Melendez-Diaz that the Sixth Amendment does not require
testimony from every person involved in the chain of custody.254 It
would also be treating unspoken assertions as solemn/formal. For
these reasons, the concept of implicit assertions of accuracy
triggering the Confrontation Clause is problematic.
Notably, these are technological problems: if the machine
had the capability to scan and verify an unadulterated seal, the
machine could make that assertion. Similarly, if the machine selfselects its parameters, no human need make that assertion either.
Even the problem of source could be solved by convoluted (but
not unimaginable) technology: a drone using 3D laser scanning
maps a crime scene,255 uses forensic-based algorithms to identify a
potential sample at the crime scene, collects it, tags it with a digital
identifier, sends the sample to a lab, and the lab analyzes it with
automated machines. With no humans vouching for the source, the
machines make the source assertion instead. This example is
science fiction today, though some of the parts exist in isolation.
Thus, even the problem of source and related concepts can be
resolved by technology. This is not inherently a problem, but it
challenges the role the Confrontation Clause will play in the future
and, in some instances, the present. In the interim, however, the
problem of source is best solved by calling the analyst who
256
operated the machine.
251. See, e.g., State v. Estell, No. 1 CA-CR 11-0846, 2012 WL 6176790, at
*5-6 (Ariz. Ct. App. Dec. 11, 2012).
252. See, e.g., United States v. Boyd, 686 F. Supp. 2d 382, 386 (S.D.N.Y.),
aff'd, 401 F. App’x 565 (2d Cir. 2010).
253. See, e.g., Aguilar v. Commonwealth, 699 S.E.2d 215, 217 (Va. 2010)
(finding no Confrontation Clause violation when one expert relied on, inter alia,
human-operated robotic extraction and processing of DNA samples by another
technician).
254. Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 557 U.S. 305, 311 n.1 (2009).
255. See Li, supra note 5.
256. Cf. THE NEW WIGMORE: EXPERT EVIDENCE, supra note 25, § 4.12.5
(discussing the problem of source and noting that, even as to machine-generated
data, without the testimony of an operating analyst a surrogate witness cannot
link the sample to the defendant or testify that proper procedures were followed
during the test); Richard Friedman, THE CONFRONTATION BLOG, Thoughts on
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I. Adapting the Confrontation Clause to the Rise of Machines
At least one option remains: the Confrontation Clause
might evolve. As automated machines increasingly rise to perform
the tasks that once were undertaken by human witnesses, the
accused’s right “to be confronted with the witnesses against him”
might expand to allow “confronting” machines.257 Although the
Confrontation Clause seeks to ensure reliability through
confrontation and cross-examination, where those tools are not
feasible in the traditional sense (how do you cross-examine a
machine?), the Clause might be interpreted to promote reliability
through analogous means.
Such an approach would not be unheard of; as noted
previously, courts could look to the models used for interpreters258
or canine evidence.259 Just as there are special requirements for
admission of canine evidence, so too could there be special
requirements for data generated by forensic machines. Courts
could adopt those requirements from the canine or interpreter tests
and apply them to forensic machines or, alternatively, they could
effectively constitutionalize a version of evidentiary requirements or
discovery rules.260 Finally, other commentators have suggested
potential ways the Clause might respond to scientific evidence in
particular, such as by requiring the analyst who prepared the
report to testify when available.261
These models all seek to preserve the thrust of the Clause,
confrontation and cross-examination, in an era the Framers did not
necessarily foresee. Failure to meet the governing test—for
Melendez-Diaz: The Product of Machines, The Confrontation Blog, (Dec. 18,
2008, 1:43 AM), http://confrontationright.blogspot.com/2008/12/thoughts-onmelendez-diaz-product-of.html (discussing these problems as “the input
proposition” and “the output proposition”).
257. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.; cf. Merritt Baer, Who Is the Witness to an
Internet Crime: The Confrontation Clause, Digital Forensics, and Child
Pornography, 30 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 31, 49 (2013)
(noting that “digital evidence will only exacerbate [problems such as those under
the Confrontation Clause], as we collect and retain drastically more data, and
rely more heavily upon intelligent Internet-based analysis systems to process that
data”).
258. See supra Part III.
259. See, e.g., Starkes v. United States, 427 A.2d 437, 439 (D.C. Cir. 1981);
State v. Streeper, 747 P.2d 71, 75 (Idaho 1987); cf. Florida v. Harris, 133 S. Ct.
1050 (2013).
260. Cf. United States v. Budziak, 697 F.3d 1105, 1112 (9th Cir. 2012).
261. See, e.g., THE NEW WIGMORE: EXPERT EVIDENCE, supra note 25,
§§ 4.10.2, 4.12.2, 4.12.10.
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example, failing to establish the accuracy of the machine,
adherence to testing protocols, and that the data was generated
from the defendant’s sample—could, as a constitutional matter,
require exclusion of the evidence. Reinterpreting the
Confrontation Clause in these ways would raise many questions:
would anyone other than the operating analyst have to testify to
satisfy these requirements? What protection would such a right
give to defendants in light of existing evidentiary rules and other
constitutional provisions? Would this right also apply to dog
handlers, interpreters, photographers, and videographers? But, in
light of the rise of the machines, such a reimagined Confrontation
Clause might be necessary. As one dissenting California justice
phrased it:
The United States Supreme Court has not decided whether
machine-generated results invariably lie beyond the reach
of the [C]onfrontation [C]lause, and I express no ultimate
view on this issue here. I simply note that as a result of ever
more powerful technologies, our justice system has
increasingly relied on ex parte computerized
determinations of critical facts in criminal proceedings—
determinations once made by human beings. A crime lab’s
reliance on gas chromatography may be a marked
improvement over less accurate or more subjective
methods of determining blood-alcohol levels. The allure of
such technology is its infallibility, its precision, its
incorruptibility. But I wonder if that allure should prompt
us to remain alert to constitutional concerns, lest we
gradually recreate through machines instead of magistrates
the civil law mode of ex parte production of evidence that
constituted the “principal evil at which the Confrontation
Clause was directed.”262
VI. CONCLUSION
The rise of the machines presents difficult questions based
on technological changes. Should the right to cross-examine really
depend on whether a gas chromatograph selects its own operating
parameters, or whether a scale or breathalyzer prints out results
instead of requiring someone to write them out by hand? One
answer is to attribute such data to the machine/progenitors and the
262. People v. Lopez, 286 P.3d 469, 494 (Cal. 2012) (Liu, J., dissenting)
(quoting Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 50 (2004)).
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operator. However, the Confrontation Clause does not clearly
require that answer, and it is reasonable to conclude that data from
human-operated machines is not attributable to the operator. In
light of those dueling options, it is more consistent with the
Confrontation Clause’s goals if courts adopt a model that preserves
a right to cross-examine human operators in circumstances where
the operator exercises control over the machine. Although today’s
forensic tools are increasingly complex, the right to cross-examine
should not be lost in so many circuit boards.
Under the current interpretation of the Confrontation
Clause, however, the right to cross-examine some individuals,
especially in the forensic setting, faces an approaching extinction.
Science increasingly delivers machines possessing fully automated
processes such that the only people who contribute to the
machine’s speech are the progenitors. This effective expiration
date on a portion of the Confrontation Clause is a possibility the
Court disfavored in Davis,263 but that, in time, will arrive. It is not
unusual for constitutional rights to contract and expand in the face
of technological change; Fourth Amendment jurisprudence has
long recognized that fact.264 The current status quo is, nonetheless,
troubling. For now, that expiration has not arrived because some
machines still require analyst input; the dawn of fully autonomous
machines has not yet arrived. But the horizon is a familiar orange,
and the sun is steadily ascending; the rise of the machines has only
begun.

263. Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 830 n.5 (2006) (“Restricting the
Confrontation Clause to the precise forms against which it was originally
directed is a recipe for its extinction.”) (internal quotation marks omitted).
264. See generally Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473 (2014) (addressing
the search-incident-to-arrest doctrine as applied to evolutions in cell phone
technology).

